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Tiivistelmä: 
 
This thesis examines the use of resilience in international policy-making. A concept that 
originally meant an ability of ecosystems to absorb disturbance has not only been welcomed 
in many disciplines outside ecology, but lately become popular in the policies of international 
organisations that claim resilience as a solution to various ‘global problems’ such as climate 
change, underdevelopment, or economic crises. The study contributes to the ongoing critical 
discussion on the governance effects of resilience. Here, the Foucauldian theory of biopolitics 
and the concept of governmentality are useful. Resilience now addresses human systems and 
communities with concepts from natural sciences, thus making it a biopolitical phenomenon.  
 
Specifically, the thesis asks how mainstreaming resilience affects the pursuit of agendas in six 
organisations: European Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, United 
Nations Development Programme, United States Agency for International Development, 
World Bank, and World Economic Forum. Using Foucauldian discourse analysis, the study is 
thematically divided into adaptive, entrepreneurial and governing aspects of resilience. Each 
part explicates how truth, power and subjectivity are constructed in the discourse. The 
analysis shows that contrary to the policy claims, resilience does not function as a solution but 
is constitutive of the problems it attempts to solve. The current policy discourse confirms pre-
existing practices and power relations, and further problematizes issues on the agendas. 
 
The thesis confirms that the policies are trapped in a neoliberal biopolitics that has 
problematic implications for human subjectivity and political agency. It further concludes that 
if resilience is to have any practical relevance and positive effects, the policy discourse has to 
be changed, for which current critical accounts do not offer a plausible direction. Therefore, a 
distinction between resilience as a policy tool and social resilience is needed, whereby the use 
of resilience as a policy solution is reduced to disaster risk reduction and similar technical 
functions, and social resilience is recognised as a communal capacity that cannot be subject to 
policy regulation. 
 
Avainsanat: resilience, biopolitics, governmentality, discourse, neoliberalism, international 
policy-making 
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1 Introduction 
 
In current accounts of the state of the world, it is quite commonplace to note that we live in “a 
world of complexity and contingency, of risk, relationality, ﬂows and mutability” (Welsh 
2014, 1). Ulrich Beck (2009) has coined this by explaining that we live in a ‘world risk 
society’ defined by inescapable and uncontrollable dangers, a theory that seems to be 
empirically strengthened by each disaster we experience (Evans 2013, 143). We learn to think 
of contingent ‘global risks’ as the greatest issues on the international political agenda. Amid 
this kind of speech, it is difficult not to come across the word resilience. One bumps into this 
catchword in various policy and research contexts, from environmentalism and climate 
change to development, economy and national security (Walker & Cooper 2011, 143), to 
name but a few. 
 
1.1 Research question 
  
In policy discourse, resilience is increasingly and more strongly presented as part of the 
solution to these ‘global problems’. Organisations in different operational levels and with 
different mandates are one by one adopting resilience into their agendas. As a regional 
political organisation with global reach, the EU aims to increase resilience within the EU in 
terms of climate change and infrastructure, and beyond the EU in its humanitarian and 
development operations. Although the EU’s foreign policy is subject to agreement between 
governments of the member states, the European Commission (EC) has a remarkable role in 
planning when it comes to development policy. Also some single countries have welcomed 
resilience in their national policies. A good example is the USA, where the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an agency of the Department of Homeland 
Security, uses resilience as a tool in emergency management, and where the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) mainstreams resilience as an approach to 
development. Globally operating agencies such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB) are promoting resilience as the best 
operational and policy framework for development. The UNDP has a strong role to play when 
it comes to international policy-making: many UNDP policies find their way into national 
policy-making. WB and the World Economic Forum (WEF), a consortium connecting 
economic actors from state-level politicians to representatives of multinational enterprises, are 
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also integrating resilience into the practices of global economy. With these examples alone, it 
is obvious that resilience plays a prominent role in various policy fields. 
 
With a strong scientific background, resilience often receives a status of the approach to be 
mainstreamed throughout an agency and with which to confront policy problems. What is 
missed by resilience scientists and policy-makers is how the diffusion of resilience affects the 
above mentioned organisations’ agenda setting and possibilities to address these problems. 
There is also an increasing critical literature claiming that what resilience actually does is to 
function as an instrumental tool for the sustainment and strengthening of global neoliberal 
governance. It may happen that the very issues in which resilience is supposedly helpful as an 
operational approach or as a policy concept remain unaddressed and the potential of 
resilience, differently framed, to function positively in terms of these problems is sidestepped. 
Thus this thesis asks: To what extent 1) does resilience in the policies of EC, FEMA, UNDP, 
USAID, WB, and WEF enable these organisations to solve the problems on their agendas and 
2) is there (consequently) a need to reformulate discourse on resilience? 
 
1.2 Brief history of the concept of resilience 
 
To be clear from the start, resilience does not have one single definition or understanding but 
it receives different disciplinary meanings and functions, even within a single discipline 
(Brand & Jax 2007). Yet, for the purposes of this thesis, it is important to give an indicative 
idea of what we are dealing with. According to the terminology of the Office of the United 
Nations Disaster Risk Reduction, resilience is “[t]he ability of a system, community or society 
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard 
in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions” (UNISDR 2007). From the quote we can see 
resilience is an active concept, describing a desired way of action – in the exemplary case 
with regard to so-called hazards. We might as well talk about resilience to risks, shocks, 
disasters, crises or change. These contingent factors increasingly shape our understanding of 
the world. They reflect the so-called complexity turn in social sciences (Urry 2005). 
Complexity theory and resilience both relate to how systems operate in a complex world. To 
understand current usage of resilience especially in the context of global politics it is 
important to understand how complexity has infiltrated social sciences. 
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Resilience has not always been concerned with disasters and crises in the human world or 
with the ability of human communities to deal with them. It was initially an ecological 
concept, first discovered in the 1970s by C.S. Holling. Holling (1973) separated resilience and 
stability as properties of an ecosystem. He argued that resilience shouldn’t be understood as 
capacity to resist changes and perturbations but on the contrary as the ability to absorb them 
and to persist despite oscillations in the surrounding environment. Stability, on the other hand, 
referred to a system’s ability to rapidly return to equilibrium after a shock. (Ibid., 17.) All this 
gained currency as concerns for ecosystems and environment grew and there appeared a need 
to ensure effective resource management. We can see that already in the beginning of the 
discussion, adaptation to and survival in changing situations were keys for resilience. 
 
At the end of the century, resilience began to be applied in many new disciplines such as 
anthropology, ecological economics and environmental psychology (Folke 2006, 255). The 
revival of resilience in the 1990s concerned its application to ‘social-ecological systems’. 
Ecological and environmental scientists perceived the traditional way of treating ecosystems 
manageable separately from social systems unsustainable because they both increasingly 
affect each other (Berkes & Folke 2000), comprising social-ecological systems that “act as 
strongly coupled, complex and evolving integrated systems” (Folke et al. 2002, 437). 
  
In these complex adaptive systems, not only adaptation to changes but continuous 
(re)organisation, transformation and development is emphasised (Folke 2006, 259–260). The 
idea of resilience changed from passive adaptation to active transformation through changes, 
yet without losing the system’s original function. Although human social systems were 
included in this “hybrid concept” of resilience (Brand & Jax 2007), the main focus of 
resilience scientists remained in ecosystem management, now taking social aspects into 
account. However, identifying ecosystems with social systems such as local communities or 
civil society makes it possible to address people in ecological and biological terms. In social-
ecological resilience terms, humans and their unions can be seen to possess similar capacities 
and abilities and perform similar functions as ecosystems. That humans got a part in this 
ecological project was crucial for the future development of resilience discourse. 
 
In the 2000s, we have witnessed a mainstreaming of the concept of resilience to all kinds of 
systems. Today, not only ecosystems, but for example states, societies and individuals in 
social and economic terms can exhibit or lack resilience. Resilience has broadened its scope 
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into economics and sustainable development (Levin et al. 1998), with the definition 
accommodating into “the ability of the system to withstand either market or environmental 
shocks without losing the capacity to allocate resources efﬁciently” (Perrings 2006, 418). 
Economic fluctuations and crises require economies to rise from each more resilient than 
before. The same is applied to individuals who endure crises at personal level. The cause of 
such a crisis can be man-made or natural. Psychological resilience focuses on how resilience 
as a personal capacity helps people to handle traumatic events such as natural disasters, terror 
attacks or personal losses more easily (e.g. Bonanno et al. 2006; Reich 2006). At the 
community level, social resilience describes communities’ ability to “withstand external 
shocks to their social infrastructure” (Adger 2000, 361). A comprehensive account of the 
development of the concept of resilience from its original purely ecological meaning to more 
general resilience approaches has been given by Fridolin Simon Brand and Kurt Jax (2007). 
 
Resilience is an important object of study because of its actuality. Research on resilience has 
mushroomed during the last decade, with both openly praising, admittedly supporting, 
suspicious, and critical voices having been heard. So far social-ecological resilience has been 
the most influential branch of ‘resilience science’. At the turn of the millennium, a network of 
like-minded scientists formed the Resilience Alliance, “a research organisation comprised of 
scientists and practitioners from many disciplines who collaborate to explore the dynamics of 
social-ecological systems” (RA 2004)1. Brian Walker and David Salt (2006, xiii) discuss the 
idea of resilience as a capacity to absorb disturbance and maintain function: “This sounds like 
a relatively straightforward statement but when applied to systems of humans and nature it 
has far-reaching consequences”. Indeed, the importance of resilience for current academic 
discussions cannot be overlooked, as “[r]esilience approaches increasingly structure, not only 
academic, but also government policy discourses, with each inﬂuencing the development of 
the other” (Welsh 2014, 1). Expertise in resilience is gathered internationally in institutions 
like the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC 2012) that function as intermediators between 
“the academic world of environmental science and the policy-making world of international 
development organisations” (Walker & Cooper 2011, 154). 
 
Besides actuality, resilience merits attention on account of its broad applicability to various 
policy fields. A well-argued genealogy of the concept of resilience and how its usage has 
                                                          
1 The Resilience Alliance publishes an openly accessible electronic journal Ecology and Society to bring up the research of its 
members. 
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evolved during the last decades is provided by Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper (2011). 
On top of strictly environmentally-oriented organisations, resilience, often associated with 
environmental management, has assumed a growing role in such policies as development, 
emergency management, humanitarianism, infrastructure, and national or global economy. As 
illustrated at the start, all the more organisations are adopting resilience policies or 
mainstreaming resilience throughout their agendas. It is as if during the last ten years actors 
on local, national, regional, and global levels had one by one discovered it as a solution to 
various challenges. 
 
During the last years, the concept of resilience and its active promoters have been faced with 
increasing criticism. Jonathan Joseph (2013, 45−52) has noted that the discourse 
“predominates in Anglo-Saxon countries and in those international organisations that fall 
under the inﬂuence of Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking” and that its meaning varies depending 
on the objects of governance. Marc Welsh (2014, 2) has observed there is now an “emerging 
critical literature [that] links complexity, resilience and modes of neoliberal governmentality”. 
Scholars representing this critical trend mainly come from the fields of security studies, 
international relations and political science, and they have pointed out effects of resilience on 
subjectivity and power or demonstrated its compatibility with the dominant neoliberal 
framework and practices of governance (e.g. Joseph 2013; Reid 2013a; Walker & Cooper 
2011; O’Malley 2010; Zebrowski 2009). The use of resilience as a tool in fields like disaster 
politics, economic crises, and climate change adaptation has raised questions of whether the 
emphasis on people’s capacities to cope with these issues is just a way to remove 
responsibility from the governing agencies to people. It is clear that despite the immense 
popularity of resilience, it would be a mistake to take for granted the alleged positive effects 
of resilience in terms of the major global issues that international organisations are expected 
to tackle. 
 
What should we make of resilience, then, as on the one hand it is said to be the key to global 
problems and on the other hand the key to how these things are articulated and communicated 
in governmental practice? Acknowledging the growing critical engagement, David Chandler 
(2014b, 46) is correct to note that “[i]t is not just policy advocates who are at home in the 
world of resilience advocacy”. He continues that “[i]n both policy advocacy and in much of 
the critical analyses, resilience is […] a reflection either of global complexity or the needs of 
power” (ibid.). This is not to undermine the importance of studying the political implications 
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of discourses. The problem with analysing discourses on a merely ‘technical’ level, revealing 
practices of governance, is that it often lacks political valuation and remains simplistic and 
reductionist (Donzelot & Gordon 2008, 54). Thus far the most comprehensive critical analysis 
of the ‘resilience paradigm’ has been given by Brad Evans and Julian Reid (2014) who 
articulate the ontological background and political implications of resilience. What have been 
lacking are discourse analyses of resilience policies, given that resilience now counts as a 
‘global policy field’ (Hannigan 2012, 20). Empirical examples have of course been given, but 
they tend to be restricted to a single institution, a country, or an event and illustrative to the 
main arguments of the author. 
 
What is common for all theorisations and policies of resilience is that they make assumptions 
about life and the nature of the world. If we accept the view that discourse is the location 
where the social construction of the world takes place, then a discourse on resilience is a 
practice of building up a particular ‘régime of truth’ (Foucault 1980, 131) that affects how we 
perceive life and the world. Where life and politics intersect in such a way, we have come to 
the realm of biopolitics, the politics of life (Foucault 2007; 2008). It is hard to deny that 
resilience is a biopolitical issue when you look at how it addresses life: it attaches life with 
some abilities and capacities and then makes claims as to how these should be put into use. 
Unfortunately resilience is not a clear-cut policy program that could be evaluated point by 
point. In order to be able to make an assessment of the effects of resilience policies and 
whether they help in response to the problems they attempt to solve, we need to look at how 
resilience functions as a biopolitical discourse. 
 
1.3 Policy analysis 
 
To answer the research question (p. 2), a study of some policy material was needed. The five 
organisations presented in the beginning – EC, FEMA, UNDP, USAID, WB, and WEF2  – 
were chosen on account of an overview of actors that during the last couple of years have 
explicitly included resilience in their activities by issuing policy documents that touch on 
resilience. The overview did not, deliberately, concentrate on academic experts or policy 
                                                          
2
 Borrowing from Hannigan’s (2012) nine categories of organisational actors in the ‘global policy field of international 
disaster politics’, these organisations cover five of the main categories: nation states (USA), regional organisations (EU), 
international finance institutions (WB), United Nations-affiliated intergovernmental organisations (UNDP), and the private 
sector (WEF’s members consist of corporations). Referring to the five objects of analysis either the term actor, agency, or 
organisation as distinct from institution (Young 1994, 3−4) is used. 
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think-tanks (such as Resilience Alliance or Stockholm Resilience Centre) which are 
sometimes behind these actors concretely promoting resilience in their activities and hence 
showing how resilience science is supposed to translate into practice. Selection of actors was 
influenced by the thought that it is important to look both at actors that have mainstreamed 
resilience for years and at those where its use is more recent. Also, against the recurrent 
argument that resilience is a neoliberal discourse, it is interesting to see how ‘specifically 
neoliberal’ institutions of global economy treat resilience; do they subscribe to social-
ecological resilience or some other version? The scope of research is limited and thus it is not 
possible – nor has it been the intention at any point – to provide an exhaustive empirical 
analysis of actors that take part in the resilience discourse globally. It is of course accurate to 
ask why some actor was chosen and not another. Considering state actors, the UK has during 
the last decade been very active in developing resilience strategies. Indeed, it has already been 
an exemplary case of many academic contributions (e.g. Chandler 2014a; Joseph 2013; 
Lentzos & Rose 2009; Zebrowski 2009). As for UN agencies, United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) could as well have been chosen as an advocate of resilience for 
environmental sustainability. Yet, UNDP appears to be today an even more prominent player 
in the global policy field of resilience.
3
 
 
The objects of analysis are explicitly Western. This is not to say that resilience has not gained 
any currency in the non-Western world; there are numerous resilience projects going on in 
Africa or South-East Asia, for example. These are, however, often initiated and at least partly 
funded by the UN, the EU or a Western donor state. As previously noted, albeit being part of 
the Western political architecture, it is not clear from the outset if these actors subscribe to the 
same understanding of resilience. 
 
For closer analysis, 10 documents were chosen
4
: from the EC, 1) an ‘EU strategy on 
adaptation to climate change’ and 2) an ‘Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 
2013-2020’; from the USA, 3) a FEMA paper on ‘Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 
2030: Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty’ and 4) a USAID policy programme 
guidance ‘Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis’; from the UNDP, 5) a report ‘Towards 
Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty’ and 6) the 
‘Human Development Report 2014’; from the WB, 7) the ‘World Development Report 2013’ 
                                                          
3 The importance of resilience for UNDP is reflected in its motto: “Empowered Lives. Resilient Nations.” 
4 A complete list of the documents on p. 92. 
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and 8) a report on ‘Building Resilience: Integrating Climate and Disaster Risk into 
Development’; from the WEF, 9) the ‘World Risk Report 2013’ and 10) report of ‘World 
Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2013: Resilient Dynamism’.5 
 
Analysing one or two texts from a single actor may appear superficial, but based on how 
recently resilience has increased in popularity, it is important to look at several actors to see if 
this phenomenon has a common ground. What makes resilience so powerful in today’s global 
politics is exactly how widely accepted and praised it has become. Yet, there is no intention to 
make a quantitative empirical contribution to resilience research but to gain a better 
understanding of what the actors talk about when they talk about resilience, and how the 
diffusion of the concept shapes their political agendas and strategies to pursue them – not 
forgetting alternative interpretations of resilience. The whole of the documents is referred to 
as ‘the policies’ or ‘the documents’. When referring to the results of the analysis as a whole, 
expressions ‘the (policy) analysis’ and ‘the analysis results’ will be used. As for the single 
organisations and their documents, the abbreviation and publication year are indicated. 
  
                                                          
5 The reason for choosing two documents from each actor was the big amount of recently published resilience-related 
material. To ensure the discourse is up-to-date only documents that were three years old at maximum (as for July 2014) were 
considered. The documents either specifically focus on resilience or have resilience as an overall framework. Although most 
are classified as reports, they are very forward-looking and not only accounting for past activity. The documents vary in 
length between 11 and 44 pages. Some of the documents include pictures or graphs which were intentionally left out of the 
analysis to treat each document in an equal manner. As for the UNDP documents and the World Development Report, only 
the summary or overview was analysed because the whole texts would have been out of the limits of a detailed analysis. 
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2 Theoretical framework and methodology 
 
In this chapter the theoretical framework of the thesis is introduced. First, because the thesis is 
structured around a discourse analysis, the social constructionist idea of discourse and 
specifically the Foucauldian way of conducting a discourse analysis with ‘an analytics of 
biopolitics’ is presented. This involves looking at the premises, power effects and 
subjectivities of discourse. Discourse serves both as a methodological and a theoretical 
concept. Second, the theory of biopolitics as it was originally framed by Michel Foucault 
(2008; 2007; 1990) is introduced. Biopolitics includes two distinct concepts, namely those of 
biopower and governmentality, the meanings of which will be clarified. It is also explicated 
how we can think of resilience in biopolitical terms. 
 
2.1 Biopolitics, biopower, and governmentality 
 
Although the concept of biopolitics was first used already in 1920 by the Swedish political 
scientist Rudolph Kjellén, it was attached to different theoretical standpoints – such as 
organicist or racist politics – than what are dominant today (Lemke 2011, 9–15). Foucault can 
be taken as the key thinker of contemporary biopolitical thought, and a Foucauldian 
understanding of biopolitics will be used in this thesis. In his genealogy of power, Foucault 
differentiates three consequent but coexisting forms: sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. 
Foucault (1995) detects the shift from sovereign forms of power to the use of disciplinary 
techniques regulating the individual. He first introduced the idea of biopolitics in 1976 in The 
History of Sexuality Vol. 1 (Foucault 1990, 140–145). The emergence of biopower as a shift 
in power’s strategy culminates in Foucault’s famous quote: “One might say that the ancient 
right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death” (ibid., 138, emphasis in the original). Foucault detects biopower as power that takes as 
centre and object of strategy the life of the human species (Foucault 2007, 1, 104–105). 
Biopower contrasts sovereign power by not aiming at total domination and destruction of life 
at will, but aiming at controlling, administering and fostering life (Foucault 1990, 138–143). 
 
Biopolitics is a step from power over life of the disciplined body to power over life of the 
human as species: “this was nothing less than the entry of life into history, that is, the entry of 
phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, 
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into the sphere of political techniques” (Foucault 1990, 141–142). In other words, Foucault 
refers to biopolitics as “a specific modern form of exercising power” where “modern human 
and natural sciences and the normative concepts that emerge from them structure political 
action and determine its goals” (Lemke 2011, 33). This is a clear indication of the biopolitics 
of resilience that has a strong background in natural science from where it is making its way 
into political discourse and programs. Foucault sometimes uses the concepts of biopolitics 
and biopower rather interchangeably. Yet, biopower can be regarded as a particular form of 
power that using “numerous and diverse techniques” takes as its object the life of the human 
as a biological being, whereas biopolitics is the governmental practice of that biopower onto 
population through “an entire series of interventions” (Foucault 1990, 139−140). 
 
Common to all accounts of biopolitics is the simple fact that they refer to a politics that has to 
do with life (Lemke 2011, 2). After this obviousness we are on uncertain ground. After 
Foucault, biopolitics has been given at least two contradicting interpretations: either a 
positive, affirmative politics of life or a negative, disastrous politics of death.
6
 Conceptual 
ambiguousness is argued to be one of the problems of biopolitics (Esposito 2008, 15). Yet, 
there is no need to conclude that “the idea of biopolitics risks diversification to the point 
where it will have little critical force” (Mills 2013, 73). As Roberto Esposito (2008, 32–33) 
notes, Foucault himself did not decide over one or the other of the conceptual poles of 
biopolitics and was never exact with definitions. 
 
Irrespective of whether biopolitics is negatively or positively perceived, it has to do with 
power. Foucault rejected the traditional idea of power as a capacity that can be owned or 
located and which works as oppression. Although “not trying to develop a general model of 
power” (Dillon 2013, 166), Foucault nonetheless understood power as relational, as a 
“multiplicity of force relations” that are embedded in society and function according to some 
logic and intentions, through subjects but not generated by them (Foucault 1990, 92–95). As 
Colin Gordon (2000, xiv–xv) notes, Foucault’s studies did not consider any particular 
ideology as such but the use of technologies of power in different political projects. Foucault 
takes biopolitics from a historical and analytical perspective, focusing on it as a governmental 
                                                          
6
 The negative approach is represented by Giorgio Agamben who recognises biopower but also that the sovereign power of 
life and death has not disappeared and can be seen in the production of ‘bare life’ – life in its mere biological existence 
separated from politically qualified life (Agamben 1998). Affirmative, although differing accounts of biopolitics have been 
given for example by Esposito (2008), Hardt and Negri (2009), McVeigh (2013) and Reid (2013b). For a more extensive 
comparative discussion of biopolitics as understood by Foucault, Agamben, Hardt, Negri, Esposito and others, see Lemke 
(2011). 
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practice, without strong value judgements. Governing populations by biopolitical means is a 
strategy available for all ideologies, belief systems and governmental rationalities, and it is 
thus impossible to judge without knowing the underlying values, aims and motives. This 
thesis follows that line of understanding, even though some view the mainstream 
interpretation of Foucault’s works being too narrowly focused on the normative 
administration of population (Hardt & Negri 2009, 57). 
 
In order to comprehensively understand Foucault’s approach, the concepts of biopolitics and 
biopower have to be added with governmentality, which is a broader concept in comparison. 
In its most general sense, governmentality refers to the ‘how’ of government (Gordon 1991, 
7). It indicates a relationship between the empirical practice of government and thought (Dean 
2010, 28). It is literally the question of different “mentalities of government” that become 
realised through certain regimes of practices, the question of “thought made practical and 
technical” (ibid., 27). Foucault (2007, 108−109) also attached governmentality with a more 
distinctly historical meaning: it describes the gradual process starting from the 16
th
 century of 
the governmentalization of the state and a concurrent emergence of the population as an 
object of government. Together these phenomena marked the advent of a distinct and 
autonomous rationality that transforms both sovereignty and discipline to function in new 
ways. Foucault described the concept as follows: 
 
First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, 
albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by 
“governmentality” I understand the tendency […] [that] has constantly led towards the pre-
eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type of 
power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of 
specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the 
development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we 
should understand […] the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages 
became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 
“governmentalized.” (Foucault 2007, 108−109.) 
 
Although Foucault outlined governmentality as the general way in which to think about 
governing, he linked this practice very closely to the advent of liberalism. He did not consider 
liberalism as merely an economic theory but “as a style of thinking quintessentially concerned 
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with the art of governing” (Gordon 1991, 14). Liberalism and later neoliberalism became 
dominant governmental rationalities that used biopolitical technologies of security on the 
level of population. Liberalism governs not by law and order, but through the free movement 
and circulation of people and things. This freedom of movement is not a right given to 
citizens but an effect of economic rationality to optimise the conduct of population. (Foucault 
2007, 48–49.) In Gordon’s (1991, 43) words, in todays’ neoliberal governmentality 
“[e]conomics thus becomes an ‘approach’ capable in principle of addressing the totality of 
human behaviour, and, consequently, of envisaging a coherent, purely economic method of 
programming the totality of governmental action”. Academic works on governmentality have 
indeed to a large part concentrated on discussing and problematizing different features of the 
current neoliberal world order. 
  
Despite recent popularity of the governmentality approach, one has to be conscious of its 
risks. The general focus of governmentality studies on programs has led to a one-sided view 
of their power and ability to obstruct any opposition and struggle (Lemke 2013, 31). In 
resilience research, so far little attention has been given either to opposition and struggle 
interior to policy programs (ibid., 42−43) or possible alternative applications of resilience 
where its advantages would be affirmed and criticism directed to reducing negative political 
implications. Programs on resilience might thus have points of compromise and resistance 
written in them. Thomas Lemke also criticises the usual technical manner in which 
governmentality studies approach their objects without making value propositions (ibid., 46–
47).  
 
However, there is some sense to Foucault’s “exemplary abstention from value judgements” 
(Gordon 1991, 6) regarding governmentality. There is an intrinsic value in analysing regimes 
of power embedded in society. Governmentality cannot give answers as to what is good or 
bad government, partly because it is not a coherent theory but rather a “distinctive critical 
perspective and a style of thought” (Lemke 2013, 51). Following Lemke, we should 
acknowledge the uselessness of extending governmentality to resilience as yet another area of 
study by demonstrating how regimes of government function in that case, which is likely to 
give foreseeable results and effectively rule out “any surprising insights derived from the 
empirical data and material” (ibid., 51). Although policy programs by no means directly 
equate their effects in the ‘real world’, discussing his study of the prison institution, Foucault 
(1991, 81) demonstrated the importance of studying them: 
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You say to me: nothing happens as laid down in these ‘programmes’ […] these programmes 
induce a whole series of effects in the real (which isn’t of course the same as saying that they 
take the place of the real): they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, 
they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things. 
 
Governmentality is a useful concept for the study of resilience, firstly because it functions as 
an exemplary criticism rather than foundational critique (Dean 2010, 50; see also Owen 
1995). It reveals the contingent nature of any governmental practice and questions its 
fundamental truths, but makes no claim as to whether we should completely reject that 
practice or guide ourselves to a certain direction. It also allows us to look at resilience as a 
specific regime of practices through which we are governed and govern ourselves (Dean 
2010, 28). This is appropriate in trying to assess the dangers and benefits of resilience as the 
received attitude towards various phenomena. When we view resilience as a practice 
sustained by a collection of contingent truth-claims, we have come to the social 
constructionist realm of discourse. Governmental discourses as examples of the Foucauldian 
politics of “rules of truth and truths of rule” are always making things happen in the material 
world (Dillon 2013, 166), hereby legitimating a governmentality study on discourse. 
 
2.2 Discourse and ‘an analytics of biopolitics’ 
 
Although studying policy documents, the thesis does not primarily address explicit plans of 
action but the discursive use of resilience. It means resilience is not something concretely 
visible or measurable. The social constructionist approach takes a critical stance towards any 
taken-for-granted knowledge. It explains our knowledge to be historically and culturally 
specific and both structured and maintained through social interaction and processes (Burr 
2003, 2−9). Language is therefore not a tool with which we describe an outside reality but a 
means to actively construct it and attach it with meanings. However, these meanings are not 
fixed but form a terrain of contestation where they are reworked and changed; language 
becomes a struggle after meaning. (Ibid., 52−57.) Discourses are always multiple and they 
compete with each other. Some become popular and dominant; others provide challenge and 
alternative. 
 
Foucault (1980) saw this struggle for meaning through language as the interplay of power and 
knowledge. Power always generates new knowledge through various instruments – for 
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example human sciences that delve into the workings of body and mind – and this knowledge 
are further used to produce or maintain power relations. Power and knowledge come together 
in discourse, which can then be drawn upon to exercise power (Burr 2003, 67−68). Discourse 
is a way of speaking about and the power of representing things; discourses “systematically 
form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972, 49). A discourse contains statements 
that at a given time and in a particular society have “received the stamp of truth” (Burr 2003, 
68) – or as Foucault would put it, what becomes when knowledge is formed in power 
relations is power-knowledge that manifests itself in a discourse (Foucault 1995, 27–28). 
Power is thus both productive of and dependent on knowledge. 
 
In addition of being productive, power is active and relational. A powerful discourse does not 
emerge out of nowhere. Discourses function through a group of relations “established 
between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, 
techniques, types of classification, and modes of characterization“ (Foucault 1972, 45). These 
relations make “possible the formation of a whole group of various objects“ and create “a 
field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity” (ibid., 44, 55). Hence, discourses not 
only name things: they are the result of a constellation of relations that regulate the conditions 
under which something can emerge as an object or a subject position can be claimed. Which 
discourse can become prominent is subject to power relations. 
 
What makes a discourse analysis specifically ‘Foucauldian’ is its focus on the ideological and 
power effects of discourse; discourses often imply what we can do to others and what can be 
done to us (Burr 2003, 18). It is an enormous power resource to be able to formulate or claim 
a discourse and make use of it politically. While looking at instances of language use, a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis also takes an interest in the practices legitimated by a 
discourse, and the underlying material conditions and social structures that contextualise these 
practices (ibid., 169−170). Power effects are often not explicit in texts that are the object of 
analysis. The analysis has to deconstruct the text and ask certain questions from it to reveal 
these effects. The results of such an analysis are, however, as much only an interpretation of 
the discourse as the discourse is an interpretation of reality. Thus one has to be critical when 
identifying discursive formations. This thesis looks at resilience as a discourse through 
biopolitical glasses that serve as an interpretative framework. 
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Foucault himself never gave any clear methodology with which one could pursue a 
biopolitical analysis of discourse. This is where Lemke’s outline of an “analytics of 
biopolitics” becomes useful (Lemke 2011, 118–120). What he aims at is to “combine two 
concepts coined by Foucault, governmentality and biopolitics, in order to conceive of 
biopolitics as ‘an art of government’” (ibid., 127). Here, biopolitics deserves the status of a 
governmental rationality of its own, rather than being merely a tool of liberal 
governmentality. This analytics was used as method to conduct the empirical analysis for the 
thesis. Drawing on Foucault’s ideas, Lemke (2013, x) identified three analytical perspectives 
from which one could analyse a biopolitical phenomenon; resilience is studied from these 
perspectives to find out the structure and content of the discourse surrounding it. 
 
First, there is knowledge of life and living beings that create regimes of truths on which a 
discourse can be based. As for knowledge on resilience, one can ask for example who has the 
authority to define and measure resilience and what things are considered problematic in 
terms of resilience. Second, power relations inherent to a biopolitical practice are discovered 
by looking at hierarchies or structures of inequality. Here one looks at how power generates 
knowledge on resilience to make some forms of life appear as valuable and others as ‘not 
worth living’, or to make some forms of suffering worth political attention and others 
acceptable. Also, the promotion of a biopolitical practice makes some winners and benefiters, 
others losers and sufferers – the analysis looks at how resilience distributes these positions. 
Third, the analytics of biopolitics targets forms of subjectivation. What kind of a subject is 
formulated through resilience and how it is expected to act? To what extent “can this process 
[of subjectivation] be viewed as an active appropriation and not as passive acceptance” 
(Lemke 2011, 120)? 
 
A similar three-fold approach has been used before by for example Johanna Oksala (2013). In 
her view, resistance to biopolitics requires addressing truth, power, and subject (ibid., 71) – 
axes that construct biopolitics. Foucault identified these axes as the triple core of his thought. 
Foucault is sometimes described as a power enthusiast who gave little room for the subject, 
but here he clearly warns of overemphasising any of the three elements – a passage that 
brilliantly crystallises the Foucauldian analytics of biopolitics and is therefore worth quoting 
at length: 
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What is involved, rather, is the analysis of complex relations between three distinct elements 
none of which can be reduced to or absorbed by the others, but whose relations are constitutive 
of each other. These three elements are: forms of knowledge (savoirs), studied in terms of their 
specific modes of veridiction; relations of power, not studied as an emanation of a substantial 
and invasive power, but in the procedures by which people’s conduct is governed; and finally 
the modes of formation of the subject through practices of self. It seems to me that by carrying 
out this triple theoretical shift – from the theme of acquired knowledge to that of veridiction, 
from the theme of domination to that of governmentality, and from the theme of the individual 
to that of the practices of the self – we can study the relations between truth, power, and subject 
without ever reducing each of them to the others. (Foucault 2011, 9.) 
 
Truth, power, and subject are categories set by the analytical framework. The questions 
Lemke proposed for each category were modified in order to make them coherent with the 
resilience framework, for example by adding to the question the word resilience. Altogether 
16 questions were used (a complete list on p. 93). The 10 policy documents were analysed by 
going through them three times, each time concentrating on one category of questions. 
Answers found were separated from the original text as units of their own and later 
reorganised thematically. When the research material is quoted, single questions are not 
indicated because the arguments have importance as parts of the three analytical dimensions. 
Lemke’s proposition is a combination of Foucault’s thoughts on biopolitics and later 
contributions to this field of study (Lemke 2011, 118). Lemke has succeeded in analytically 
coining the triple core of knowledge, power, and subject into a form that is easy to apply in 
further research. The analytics of biopolitics is well compatible with the concepts of biopower 
and governmentality which together serve as the theoretical framework for the thesis. 
 
2.3 Structure of the study 
 
The following four chapters each address the elements of truth, power, and subjectivity. They 
look at the truth-claims surrounding resilience policies, subjectivities generated, practices 
legitimated, and various political implications of this current urge by various actors to diffuse 
resilience as a solution to the most dissimilar of problems. 
 
In chapters 3−5, analysis results are thematically organised according to the issues that are on 
the policy agendas and the consequent emphases on the different dimensions of resilience. 
They show how from these perspectives the diffusion of resilience into the policies of the 
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studied organisations is shaping their strategies to pursue their political agendas. Chapters 3−5 
present distinct features of resilience, though not necessarily being different discourses but 
possibly overlapping dimensions.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the first dimension: adaptive disaster resilience. Here the disastrous 
nature of the world and humanity’s vulnerability are considered, with an idea of building 
resilience as an individual and communal capacity. The focus is on adaptation to the 
prevailing conditions of the world. In chapter 4, attention is given to the entrepreneurial, 
economic dimension of resilience. Economy serves as a crisis factor but also as an 
opportunity structure and as a system to whose needs the subject is constructed. 
 
Chapter 5 adopts a more macro perspective on resilience and finds out what role resilience 
plays as a governance discourse. Many actors claim to understand resilience so well they are 
willing to help others build resilience. Resilience is taken up as an operational focus in many 
powerful organisations, but it is not an isolated island of activity. Resilience has been 
incorporated to many other policies and mainstreamed throughout organisations, which 
contributes to strengthening the global governance architecture. Governance has also effects 
on the agency of the subject, which is discussed in this chapter. 
 
Finally, in chapter 6 it is asked if the problems of the current discourse constitute a need to 
reformulate our understanding of resilience, and some recent contributions to this discussion 
are accounted for. It is also necessary to keep an eye open to possible frictions and hints of 
resistance within and around the discourse that might give a chance for different uses of the 
concept. It is asked if there are alternative ideas of resilience amid the current discourse or if 
some of the ideas from the analysis can be generated to construct the discourse anew. 
Ultimately this chapter ponders if resilience is of any use for individuals, communities, states 
or other actors in solving their problems. An alternative approach to resilience is outlined. In 
chapter 7 the thesis is concluded by drawing together the different dimensions of the current 
policy discourse and the problems that the analysis revealed. Future prospects with regard to 
the importance and use of resilience and research around it are briefly discussed. 
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3 Adaptive resilience 
 
The most explicit reason why the organisations were promoting resilience had to do with a 
shared view of the disastrous state of the world. The logic goes that we live in disastrous 
times, and because we are – despite our best efforts – vulnerable to disaster, although some 
more than others, there is a necessity to adapt, and resilience is a key to this capacity. This 
chapter shows that by prescribing resilience as a cure for disaster, the policies are establishing 
the permanence of disaster as a truth that demands building resilience by problematizing 
vulnerability. Resilience as a form of adapation is also critically discussed. 
 
3.1 Disastrous environment 
 
In the policies, many statements were about disasters, emergencies and conflicts threatening 
people and societies. EC (2013b, 1) highlights the severity of the issue: “The increasing 
frequency and intensity of disasters and humanitarian crises results in great suffering and loss 
of life, posing a major threat to long-term development, growth and poverty reduction.” Some 
of these ‘events’ can be located at a state or in a region but often an impact is felt directly or 
indirectly in many further places, either physically or in economic and development terms. 
The main idea is that resilience helps in responding to disaster. The need to actively cooperate 
for resilience in all levels is due to the nature of risk and disaster that do not respect national 
boundaries (EC 2013b, 4; FEMA 2012, 20) and which “no one country or agent acting alone” 
can deal effectively with (WB 2013a, 33−34). Also, “[t]he resilience of a country includes its 
capacity to recover quickly and well from disasters” (UNDP 2014, 11−12), reflecting social-
ecological resilience as “capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while 
undergoing change” (Walker et al. 2004). 
 
What counts, then, as disaster, hazard, risk or threat for resilience? Resilience does not take 
part in such a debate or demarcate an area of application for example by focusing solely on 
so-called natural disasters as single events in opposition to long-term situations like famines 
and droughts (Hannigan 2012, 13). On the contrary, resilience is promoted as the general way 
of action in ‘adverse events’ of which we can gather a long list from the policies, ranging 
from natural to infrastructure hazards. Whichever problem is on the agenda can function as a 
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target for which resilience is built; for example, EC focuses on resilience to climate change 
(EC 2013a) and humanitarian crises (2013b). 
 
The relationship between disasters and politics has been subject to a strong academic debate 
(Hannigan 2012, 6−12). Disasters have been studied for decades, but the reason for the earlier 
neglect of the “disaster-politics nexus” was due to the assumed apolitical nature of disaster 
response (ibid., 7). Responses to disasters were usually conducted by non-governmental 
humanitarian agencies that worked ‘outside of politics’, leaning on humanitarian values of 
neutrality and impartiality (Duffield 2007, 74–76; Barnett & Weiss 2008, 3–5). Resilience as 
a manner of response is nothing short of a political choice and a clear change in discourse; 10 
years ago it played only a minor role in the studied organisations but is now the received 
attitude. While disasters are not apolitical, it has also been argued that what constitutes a 
disaster is a process of social construction that can be acted upon, and that “there is no such 
thing as a natural disaster” (Smith 2006). 
 
Disaster resilience cannot be taken as merely a technical or benevolent response to objectively 
identifiable disasters, devoid of power effects. The concern for adverse events is strongly 
connected to the discourse of sustainable development where changes in our environment 
threaten the whole existence of social-ecological systems, constituting a threat that can’t be 
left to humanitarians alone. Two decades ago, Arturo Escobar (1996) noted that nature’s 
signification as ‘environment’ and the identification of ‘global problems’ that its changes give 
rise to is a rather novel phenomenon that can be traced back to the 1972 Club of Rome report 
Limits to Growth and later upheld by the discourse of sustainable development. Social-
ecological resilience has incorporated these environmentalist ideas that our environment has 
inherent limits – illustrated by concepts like ‘tipping points’, ‘thresholds’ and ‘planetary 
boundaries’ – to which human activity should be adapted (Folke et al. 2011; Powell, Kløcker 
Larsen & van Bommel 2014). Carl Folke et al. (2011, 719) describe how  
 
[d]uring the last couple of generations, we have witnessed an amazing expansion of human 
activities into a converging globalized society, enhancing the material standard of living for a 
large part of people on earth […] [The expansion] has pushed humanity into a new geological 
era, the Anthropocene, and generated the bulk of the global environmental changes with 
potential thresholds and tipping points, currently challenging the future wellbeing of the human 
population on Earth. 
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The policy analysis endorses this dangerousness. The discourse is based on a collection of 
truth-claims that the world is disastrous and will be even more so in the future (FEMA 2012, 
15). Environmental concerns dominate the disastrous prospects of the future: “[t]he costs of 
disasters are rising and become increasingly unaffordable, as climate change generates more 
severe weather related events and as the world faces new hazards and pressures” (EC 2013b, 
1). The rise in the cost of disasters is generally thought to be due to the impacts of climate 
change “expected to increase the severity, frequency, or scale” of disastrous events (FEMA 
2012, 8). For the resilience discourse climate change functions as the ultimate catastrophe – 
an uncontested truth – that threatens not only ecosystems and societies but economies and 
services provided by ecosystems
7
 (EC 2013a, 2−3). As W. Neil Adger et al. (2001, 708−709) 
have noted, “the dominant ideas within global environmental change are based on a belief that 
we are on the verge of global catastrophe, placing strain on a fragile earth and risking 
irreversible change”. These ideas are backed by scientific analyses and generally accepted 
knowledge (ibid., 701, 706). 
 
Many have connected this endemic disaster landscape with the conditions of neoliberal 
governmentality. Neoliberalism is commonly understood as “a theory of political economic 
practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximisation of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property 
rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2007, 22). Yet, 
neoliberalism implies also “a complex assemblage of ideological commitments, discursive 
representations, and institutional practices” (McCarthy & Prudham 2004, 276). Neoliberalism 
is “an environmental project” in so far as it incorporates environmentalism through the 
discourse of sustainable development (ibid., 277−279, emphasis in the original) which 
effectively reconciles the needs of growth and environment (Escobar 1996) with practices like 
commodification and privatisation of ecosystem services (Robertson 2004). Rather than 
rejecting environmentalism as opposed to the principles of capital and market economy, 
neoliberalism endeavours to manage environment to these ends.  
 
Recalling Foucault’s (2007; 2008) ideas about (neo)liberal governmentality, these are 
reflections of liberalism’s aim to ensure its objects a space of freedom to act according to their 
interests, a ‘milieu of security’ where life processes and circulations of the population can 
                                                          
7
 For a critical discussion of ecosystem services in environmental management, see Robertson 2004. 
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take place according to certain norms (Foucault 2007, 20−23). For Foucault, liberalism was 
never primarily an economic doctrine but a governmental rationality that “will act on the 
environment and systematically modify its variables” (Foucault 2008, 271). Liberalism thus 
aims to secure life in its liberal forms to sustain itself (Evans & Reid 2013, 86−89). 
Paradoxically, producing this freedom of activity entails pointing out, controlling and 
managing a myriad of events and phenomena that are considered as endangering the freedom 
and interest of people. The interplay of freedom and security has been a never-ending game of 
liberalism (Foucault 2008, 63−66). Here we come to an early connection between liberalism 
and resilience. People are urged to live according to what Foucault described as the motto of 
liberalism: “live dangerously” (ibid., 66). Foucault argued that “individuals are constantly 
exposed to danger, or rather, they are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their 
present, and their future as containing danger” (ibid.). Thus in a neoliberal framing, those who 
favour resilience are preconditioned to see danger everywhere. The dangers are not 
necessarily war, plague or invasion like under the sovereign rule, but biopolitically framed 
everyday events such as illness, old age, criminality, or bankruptcy threatening human life. 
 
According to Evans (2013, 35), distinct to current forms of neoliberalism is that they advance 
a catastrophic topography that is “planetary in vision”. Everything can potentially be a threat. 
In the era of resilience, this is reflected in the policies so that development not only has to be 
sustainable but also “climate and disaster resilient” (WB 2013b). This is not a neutral claim 
but reflects rationality behind evoking threats: liberalism proceeds through catastrophic 
emergencies that function as sites of intervention and regulation (Evans 2013, 37, 44). The 
more we seek to identify and analyse threats, the more our ‘imaginary of threat’ expands and 
things suddenly become dangerous (ibid., 87−88). This has led to a “terrifying yet normal 
state of affairs” (Evans & Reid 2014, 16) where everyday events can possibly generate a 
catastrophe – a view that the world is “insecure by design” (ibid., 194). 
 
The policy analysis to a great extent supports this critique of liberal endangerment where the 
normality of environment is generalised crisis (Massumi 2009). The normalisation of 
emergency and catastrophic topographies of the present is reflected by UNDP: 
 
Yet, development everywhere is facing a series of new challenges, ranging from climate change 
to the energy crisis, from food insecurity to citizens’ insecurity, from financial and economic 
crises to growing global inequalities. Shocks and crises appear to have become the norm, rather 
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than the exception. And as a result, countries have become ever more vulnerable in the face of 
such challenges. We now live in a world of uncertainty. (UNDP 2011, 1.) 
 
What should we then make from the shocks, stresses, conflicts and dramatic events that are 
said to characterise contemporary living (USAID 2012, 9)? Should we question the disastrous 
truth told us by international organisations promoting resilience? Even if we take all disasters 
to be socially constructed events and stopped defining them as crises, it is true that the events 
we habitually term natural disasters are to some extent unpredictable and statistically 
inevitable in specific geographical spots and not the result of neoliberal dominance. 
 
The acknowledgement of disaster politics in resilience discourses ought not to lead to a 
rejection of certain events locally regarded as problems. Although affirming the neoliberal 
truth-claim of endangerment, resilience policies are tasked with providing tools for people to 
act against it. Resilience to disturbances in the living environment can be useful if it leads to 
greater awareness and knowledge of disastrous events that can be prepared for; resilience is 
used as a technical concept similar to the ‘capacity of a system’. It includes early warning 
systems (WB 2013a, 36), innovative technology such as resilient construction materials (EC 
2013a, 6) and institutional capacity to respond to shocks (UNDP 2014, 14). All this  
 
[…] requires that there be specific technical capacities in organisations and institutions on the 
front lines of a crisis response and that core country systems (such as procurement, public 
finance management, and monitoring and evaluation systems) display qualities of performance, 
stability and adaptability (UNDP 2011, 10). 
  
If the aim is to experience as little harm as possible it may require resilience to events that 
cannot be prevented by political will. The problem with this technical framing of resilience is 
that it may mask the underlying politics of the discourse (Evans & Reid 2014, 22); responses 
to natural hazards are no less political than responses to man-made conflicts. 
 
Here, even a predisposition to a dangerous environment can generate a position where 
resilience is needed. The difficulty is an objective identification of disaster. EC, FEMA, 
UNDP, USAID, WB, and WEF apply resilience to what they see as disaster, not necessarily 
to what the target populations of their policies would view as such. It is a widely held view 
that especially climate-related disasters have increased in frequency (WB 2013a, 9; Clark 
2012). Indeed, we can’t deny the occurrence of severe weather-related or geophysical events 
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with massive human and material loss.
8
 Some interpretations attribute the growing impacts 
firstly to the expansion of population and its concentration in high-risk areas such as coasts 
and seismic regions (Hannigan 2012, 59−60). Development of communication and 
monitoring technologies has also helped the formation of a global community of disaster 
researchers and thus enhanced keeping disaster records (ibid.). Disasters may have increased 
in absolute number, but attention should be paid to the discursive effect of disaster resilience: 
is it reducing impact or occurrence of disaster or invoking more disaster? Is the major effect 
of resilience to enlarge the sense of eternal endangerment? From the analysis can be said that 
resilience is part of the social construction of disaster, not a solution to objectively identifiable 
events. 
 
3.2 Vulnerable human 
 
The documents highlighted that we should take the issue of resilience seriously on the account 
that we are all vulnerable to various negative events (WB 2013a, 35; UNDP 2011, 2). 
Vulnerability is stated as a truth that can be verified by scientific knowledge and statistics on 
adverse events. Indeed, if we were somehow above all threats that life can face, there would 
be no need to be resilient. But what is meant with vulnerability? Early scholarship on 
ecological resilience did not address vulnerability (Holling 1973), but it came into the 
discussion once resilience started to be applied to social-ecological systems, often in terms of 
environmental hazards (Adger 2006, 268−270). Adger (2006) has reviewed research on 
vulnerability and outlined convergences with resilience literature; it is clear that the concepts 
of vulnerability and resilience are related. Definitions for vulnerability are many, but as Adger 
(ibid., 269) notes, “[i]n all formulations, the key parameters of vulnerability are the stress to 
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. Thus, vulnerability 
research and resilience research have common elements of interest.” 
 
Analysis results are in line with the above formulation. Mostly vulnerability is given no 
explicit definition but regarded as a general negative status that makes people and nations 
subject to various shocks. However, as there are different kinds of hazards, also vulnerability 
is differentiated (UNDP 2011, 3). There is, first, vulnerability to severe weather and climate 
                                                          
8
 From the last 10 years one could mention the South-East Asian tsunami (2004), the Haiti earthquake (2010), the Japan 
earthquake and tsunami (2011), hurricane Sandy in North America (2012) and typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013). 
These are only a few examples that happened to receive wide international attention. 
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change risks (WEF 2013a, 20; EC 2013a, 2), in other words vulnerability to disasters. There 
is also vulnerability of infrastructure or “critical supplies” (FEMA 2012, 9, 17). References to 
economic vulnerability were frequent especially in the UDNP (2011) report on human 
resilience. Economic vulnerability is reflected either on macro or micro level, in other words 
it can consider national economies or the economy of households (UNDP 2011, 3; WB 2013a, 
11−12). 
 
Hence, on a factual level, vulnerability cannot be described as merely a social phenomenon or 
be caused by environmental change alone because it is attached to natural, physical and social 
systems alike and attributed to different hazards. The organisations aim to project 
vulnerability as a problem that resilience can help to diminish, thereby increasing the capacity 
of the vulnerable to face disaster. Vulnerability is a threat not only to the life in question but 
to the process of development: “[m]aking vulnerability reduction central in future 
development agendas is the only way to ensure that progress is resilient and sustainable” 
(UNDP 2014, 13). 
 
Resilience is promoted by actors at national, regional or global level. It is required both in the 
richest and the poorest countries, and everything in between. But is vulnerability equally 
spread? The policies are replete with explicit couplings of vulnerability with ‘the poor’ or 
‘poverty’ (EC 2013b, 1; UNDP 2011, 2; WB 2013a, 4). Analysis indicates that being 
vulnerable does not necessarily mean being poor – all countries and populations are affected – 
but if you’re poor, you’re immediately considered vulnerable. Here the discourse establishes 
an asymmetry and enhances existing power relations between those countries and institutions 
that are promoting resilience and the so-called poor and vulnerable populations that are in 
need of it. This is then taken to practice “by comprehensively addressing the root causes” of 
vulnerability (USAID 2012, 14), which often means poverty. Poverty is seen a threat to the 
environment because “[g]iven the resource-dependence of rural populations in developing 
countries […] it is tempting to conclude that poverty is a major cause of environmental 
degradation in poorer economies” (Barbier 2010, 636). Although this is a simplistic picture 
(ibid.), resilience policies regard poverty as the biggest cause of vulnerability. The value of 
life is defined by the ability to escape vulnerability (i.e. the ability to build resilience to 
manage environment). Emphasising the vulnerability of the life of a population or an 
individual casts a negative shadow and implies that this life is not sufficient, or is somehow 
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not worth of living. Life is stigmatized by loss, suffering and impoverishment (UNDP 2011, 
2; USAID 2012, 3). 
 
There are at least two ways of understanding vulnerability. One is to look at it as a context-
specific condition that is contingent on stress, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (UNCEB 
2013, 13). The more vulnerable you are, the less resilient you will be, and vice versa. This 
means you have to become resilient to reduce vulnerability. Are resilience and vulnerability 
merely each other’s antonyms in a technical, factual sense? As Philippe Bourbeau (2013, 9) 
has pointed out, this question implies the problematic premise of much of the resilience 
literature to treat resilience in a binary way, as an “all or nothing concept”. More strikingly, 
this leads to accepting vulnerability as a pre-given condition which leads to a demand for 
resilience; while some are deemed more resilient than others, “none can be understood as 
being fully resilient. […] We can only ever be somewhere along the continuum of resilience, 
and therefore ultimately are all in need of enabling to become more resilient.” (Chandler 
2012, 217.) 
 
The second approach is pursued by authors with a critical standpoint. They emphasise that the 
whole discourse of resilience is based on the idea that to be able to become resilient the object 
– be it the individual human, a social-ecological system, or humanity and biosphere at large – 
has to be accepted as “fundamentally vulnerable” (Evans & Reid 2013, 84). Evans and Reid 
argue that resilience is a deeply political question. They see vulnerability as an ontological 
assumption of biological life and any effort to frame vulnerability in technical terms is only a 
“mask of mastery for liberal power”. (Evans & Reid 2014, 1, 22, 40.) Despite the subject’s 
factual exposure to and probability to be hit by a disaster, it is thought that disasters are 
perpetual and in the face of them, the human is always vulnerable. It is further argued that 
vulnerable subjects of resilience should not look to states or other authorities for guarantee of 
security but secure life for themselves (Reid 2013a, 359); yet, resilience calls not for freedom 
from danger but a need to engage with the necessity of exposure to danger (Evans & Reid 
2013, 87, 95). The vulnerable subject’s mission becomes to demonstrate its resilient capacity 
to live with the world’s dangers (Reid 2012a, 76). From this perspective, it is impossible to 
reduce vulnerability through resilience. 
 
Biopolitics as a mode of governing promotes some forms of life for certain political interests. 
It seeks to determine what a good life is, what threatens this form of life and what measures 
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have to be taken in order to secure that life from those threats. Central to neoliberalism is a 
specific understanding of subjectivity and “human nature” (Read 2009, 26). When the life of 
the human subject is defined by its vulnerability and the gaze of liberalism (Evans & Reid 
2013, 87) screens the world in order to control the reasons for that vulnerability, this 
inevitably has its political consequences on how we should conduct our lives. The inclusion 
of vulnerability in the resilience discourse has generated strong power relations between those 
who can determine vulnerability and those who are deemed vulnerable. All agencies used 
their authority to conceive vulnerability as self-evident truth that translates into political 
demands of appropriate behaviour to deal with that vulnerability. 
 
It is important to ask why many lives are only determined through suffering from 
vulnerability (e.g. EC 2013b, 1; USAID 2012, 3) and not by the suffering that this supposed 
vulnerability causes? This reflects Chandler’s (2012, 216) remark that in terms of endemic 
crises and disasters, the targets of international crisis intervention are nowadays “vulnerable 
subjects” and not “victims”, with a further emphasis on prevention rather than protection in 
crisis. Does this mean that instead of falling victim to a sudden shock that would require 
immediate humanitarian response, the poor are considered predisposed to vulnerability and 
thus their probability of falling victim to a disaster is acknowledged beforehand and the 
immediate needs can be neglected under the shadow of pre-acknowledged vulnerability? Here 
vulnerability leads to bypassing calls for first-hand humanitarian aid, which advocates of 
humanitarianism fear to be the outcome of resilience policies (Levine et al. 2012). Also, 
vulnerability becomes a legitimating factor for governmental interference: the legitimacy for 
sketching resilience policies partly lies on accounts of the vulnerable objects of these plans. 
 
Judith Butler (2006; 2009) takes quite an opposite approach to vulnerability and claims that 
by understanding vulnerability/precariousness we might actually achieve more security. 
Rather than seeing vulnerability as the miserable condition of some populations that can be 
exploited, in Butler’s terms we should recognise our mutual interdependence and 
vulnerability. We are all, as humans, dependent on others for our existence: “Loss and 
vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at 
risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that 
exposure” (Butler 2006, 20). Hence, everyone depends on others for his or her survivability, 
and therefore we shouldn’t think of other people or nations as threats to our existence. Butler 
outlines that mindfulness of this interdependence could be a basis of non-military and non-
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violent solutions to global affairs; not abandoning autonomy but recognising the concomitant 
physical vulnerability to one another (ibid., 27−29). Here vulnerability is intersubjective 
rather than in the policy analysis where it is a feature of the subject in its relation to an 
external reality. 
 
Despite the idea that vulnerability is a feature of all life, Butler acknowledges the fact that 
human physical vulnerability is inequitably distributed and that many populations are 
conditioned to be living a life that makes them more vulnerable than others, and that is why 
all have obligations for others in terms of minimizing precarity (Butler 2006, 30−32; 2009, 
25−26). Calling for global responsibility and a moral obligation to “make life liveable” by 
addressing basic needs, Butler sounds like a global humanitarian who tries to convince the 
international community about its obligations. The approach is idealistic but arguably naïve in 
terms of practicality: the required global reciprocal recognition of vulnerability is unlikely to 
realise. Governments and international organisations acknowledge vulnerability, but there is 
always an inner hierarchy that ascribes it to a smaller group who are more or most vulnerable 
in relative terms (UNDP 2014, ii; FEMA 2012, 2; EC 2013a, 2). 
 
Another problem is that the acceptance of precariousness does not mean the disappearance of 
injurability and threat; neither does it give the feeling of security. Precarity is a useful 
analytical concept for observing the workings of vulnerability in the resilience discourse. 
Butler’s idea of interdependence and mutual vulnerability is arguably present in the liberal 
way of security and development where other countries’ development is a concern for our 
security. But how could we make use of the concept of vulnerability without falling into a 
trap of eternal endangerment? A lot depends on how we think of vulnerability: is it inherent of 
human life, just a contingent circumstance of today or is it about some structural ‘root 
causes’? If we subscribe to one or both of the latter two, vulnerability could be an indicator of 
how to direct security measures in a society. The danger remains, however, that resilience 
projects in so-called vulnerable societies easily become like today’s peace-building missions 
in post-conflict countries where “post-conflict reconstruction is not only directed at countries 
affected by war” but where “peace-building missions are directed at reconstructing the people 
living in those countries” (Alt 2013, 87, emphasis in the original). 
 
As the analysis revealed, not only is resilience not reducing vulnerability but it is sometimes 
pursued in and of itself, in which case vulnerability is regarded a hindrance. The idea is that 
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vulnerability prevents people from becoming resilient (Chandler 2012, 217); in other words, a 
vulnerable system has effectively already “lost resilience” (Folke 2006, 262). A change in the 
discourse and operations of the studied organisations is needed, for resilience could be a 
means of overcoming some vulnerabilities by recognising them when they are factual. 
Resilience should give the possibility to feel secure despite vulnerability and also to reduce 
vulnerability (Berkes 2007). Here, resilience is understood as an active capacity of people, not 
a passive interest of government. 
 
If we are to speak of vulnerability in a non-discriminating way, its biopolitical use that is 
implicit in the documents should be strongly reversed. Today, some populations are 
biopoliticised by describing them as “chronically vulnerable” (USAID 2012, 9) as if 
vulnerability was an illness. There is a need to reject a discourse that treats life as exclusively 
vulnerable or vulnerable lives not fully living. An autonomous capacity to pursue security 
should be affirmed, but if this is aimed at by rejecting vulnerability altogether, it can be 
detrimental to the everyday security in the surrounding conditions that you can oppose but 
maybe not make away. Denying vulnerability to achieve security would also suggest denying 
the world’s complex and interconnected nature that gives rise to what the organisations term 
vulnerability. 
 
3.3 Building resilience and adaptive capacity 
 
In the policies, the premise of the disastrousness of the world and the ensuing vulnerability of 
social-ecological systems are the background against which resilience is promoted. Resilience 
is said to reduce vulnerability and help systems and societies to withstand shocks that cannot 
all be prevented (USAID 2012, 4; WEF 2013B, 28). Ecological and environmental scientists 
derive the resilience of social-ecological systems from nature’s and ecosystems’ capacity to 
absorb disturbances in their environment (Walker et al. 2004). Central to the agencies’ 
understanding of resilience is its attachment both to persons and systems. The difference in 
emphasis between resilience scholars and policy-makers is that while scholars highlight the 
innate ability of living systems to react resiliently, policy-makers tend to formulate resilience 
as a capacity that can be “learnt”, “build”, and “increased”. A central element of resilience – 
whether you look at the discourse in academia or in international politics – is the concept of 
adaptive capacity/adaptability. Some actors included adaptation in their definitions of 
resilience (EC 2013b, 3; WEF 2013b, 18; USAID 2012, 4). 
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Prominent resilience scientists view resilience “as a framework for understanding how to 
sustain and enhance adaptive capacity in a complex world of rapid transformations” (Folke et 
al. 2002, 437). Adaptive capacity is an inseparable part of the so-called social-ecological 
systems. Walker et al. (2004) have described adaptability, along with resilience and 
transformability, as three complementary attributes that determine the dynamics of social-
ecological systems. Adaptability refers in this case to a social component: “the capacity of 
humans to manage resilience” (ibid.). In other words, adaptability is seen both as a part and a 
prerequisite of resilience (Folke et al. 2010). 
 
International organisations have taken up these scientific interpretations and reformulated 
them in policy discourse. USAID (2012, 5, 10) declares one of its main goals in the resilience 
programme to be “increased adaptive capacity” that is “the ability to quickly and effectively 
respond to new circumstances”. It is specifically the human populations whom the resilience 
policies try to provide with adaptive capacity, which is a prime example of biopoliticisation. 
The need to apply ecological resilience to social systems and increase their adaptability rises 
from the previously recognised environmental rationality that guides resilience scholars to a 
large extent. Lack of recognition for the interdependence of the social and the ecological is in 
their view the biggest reason for problems in ecosystems or natural resource management 
(Folke et al. 2010). In the sustainability discourse, “[t]his new reality, from which there is no 
escape, must be recognized–and managed” (WCED 1987), and profound social and societal 
change is likely to be required (Folke et al. 2010). 
 
As observed, the principal issue stated to require adaptation is climate change, which is where 
the concept of adaptation has found its way into the language of international relations (Alt 
2013, 95). Adaptation has gained so much in importance that it has become the “preferred 
governance configuration” of the social-ecological resilience discourse (Powell, Kløcker 
Larsen & van Bommel 2014, 141), coined diversely in terms such as ‘adaptive governance’ 
(Folke et al. 2011), ‘planetary stewardship’ (ibid.), ‘earth system governance’ (Biermann et 
al. 2010), or ‘ecosystem stewardship’ (Chapin et al. 2010), all of which point towards political 
action in line with the normative idea of sustainability. To transfer the originally ecosystem-
related concept to demands of social and societal change is a clear example of the biopolitics 
of resilience: with anthropogenic effects (WEF 2013b, 29) of the era of the ‘Anthropocene’, 
human populations are not just adapting to an external natural environment but functioning as 
drivers of environmental change and increased interdependence of human societies (Biermann 
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2014). EC (2013a, 2) concludes there is “no choice but to take adaptation measures to deal 
with the unavoidable climate impacts and their economic, environmental and social costs”. 
Especially with regard to climate change, “resilience and adaptation now sit side by side, 
potentially displacing the more revolutionary concept of mitigation” (Welsh 2014, 5). 
 
Part of the effectiveness of resilience is the regime of truth it has constructed around these 
‘scientific truths’. The question whether climate and other environmental change are real 
phenomena that require a human response is a matter not appropriate to be dealt with here
9
, 
but it is clear they are constructed as problems in the adaptive resilience discourse. Again, 
irrespective of the true events that have taken and are taking place, it is the political language 
of the policies around these changes that requires critical attention. Being critical does not 
mean rejecting the changes as such (Evans & Reid 2014, 148). As Biermann (2014, 57) 
correctly notes, the Anthropocene “has to be understood as a global political phenomenon”.  
 
The political question is what implications the institutional mainstreaming of adaptive 
governance entails. Adaptation to the vulnerable conditions of the biosphere requires a change 
in behaviour, and the policy discourse is clear on the responsibilities at all levels to build 
resilience (USAID 2012, 16). Resilience building is expected from each individual in general 
and leaders in particular (WEF 2013b, 18), and from all countries in general but from risk-
prone communities in particular (ibid., 4; EC 2013b, 2). Reid (2012a, 72) highlights the 
tendency to put pressure for building resilience on those people who are most likely to act in 
an ‘environmentally ignorant’ manner: the poor. Indeed, Folke et al. (2010) lead us to ask if in 
a particular system there is a “social dimension that creates barriers or bridges for ecosystem 
stewardship” or if there are “deeper, slower variables in social systems, such as identity, core 
values, and worldviews that constrain adaptability”. Folke et al. are indirectly pointing to the 
poor as a ‘social dimension’ or ‘variable’ that requires correcting. Importantly, the local and 
the global poor have been the main points of application for policies inspired by liberal 
concerns for order and security, as well as for many resilience policies today, for “[w]hile the 
wealthy are most heavily armed and bellicose, the poor seem to inspire most fear” (Dillon 
2013, 169). 
 
                                                          
9
 For a discussion of the “denial discourse”, see for example Adger et al. 2001, 706−708. 
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Should we talk about positive adaptation or negative acceptance of the “permanence and 
unfathomable variability” of risk (WEF 2013b, 4)? Many scholars are concerned with the 
generalised demand to adapt. They argue that in the dominant discourse, the human is 
resilient “in so far as it adapts to rather than resists the conditions of its suffering in the world” 
(Reid 2012a, 76) and it can only “avoid extinction through the ability to constantly adapt to 
uncertainty” (Duffield 2011, 763). Bourbeau (2013, 8) observes that resilience is often 
defined as positive adaptation to a negative shock. He is correct in displaying the possibilities 
for both positive and negative adaptation, which is situation-, time- and culture-specific (ibid., 
8−10). Adaptation can include a consequent change, and this change can be either positive or 
negative, the determination of which is sometimes a question of value. In other words, one 
can adapt to both positive and negative changes (ibid., 8).  
 
Consequently, there is a need to differentiate between adaptation as passive acceptance, 
adaptation as neutral acknowledgement, and adaptation as positive affirmation. In some 
instances, adaptation can be merely a way to survive a physical threat; in others, adaptation 
indeed signifies a political surrender, if one by adapting to a situation gives up the possibility 
to stand up against suffering. Adaptation does not necessarily mean resilience replacing 
resistance: adaptation can be an affirmative decision not to give up and a determination to 
hold on to something politically important despite changes in the surrounding conditions. This 
is a positive interpretation of “the capacity to absorb shocks and still maintain function” 
(Folke 2006, 253). 
 
There is nothing problematic in building resilience as such, even if the tools are imported, as 
long as it is a self-generated project. It is creditable that when facilitating efforts to build 
resilience, the organisations aim to account for local needs, desires, commitments, knowledge, 
and inclusive decision-making among key actors (USAID 2012, 16; EC 2013b, 4). But 
policy-makers should understand that no matter how much they rhetorically invest in 
respecting ‘local ownership’ and ‘local practices’, they hardly reach the point of respecting 
real political diversity (Alt 2013, 98), something that does not take place in the atmosphere of 
consensus-building (UNDP 2011, 13). Folke et al. (2011, 729) interestingly note that 
“transparent, and inclusive decision-making processes that are viewed as legitimate by 
stakeholders, are a precondition for effective adaptive governance systems to emerge”, yet 
“[e]ven though self-organisation and collaboration in polycentric settings hold a great 
potential, these require both institutional and economic support to be able to function 
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effectively in the longer term”. Here, stakeholder agency is ostensible and conditioned upon 
outside assistance, which necessitates a reconfiguration of the discourse in line with a more 
active agency outlined above.  
 
Although this chapter on adaptive resilience has put emphasis on structure and external 
problems, remaining vague on the agency of the subject, Joseph (2013, 40) notes a shift “from 
thinking about the dynamics of systems to emphasising individual responsibility, adaptability 
and preparedness”. Folke (2006, 253) reminds that while a “lot of work on resilience has 
focused on the capacity to absorb shocks […] there is also another aspect of resilience that 
concerns the capacity for renewal, re-organisation and development”. Whereas in the 
ecological literature resilience is sometimes reactively modelled as mere adaptation to 
external influences, lately more proactive subjectivities have emerged (O’Malley 2010, 489), 
whereby resilience welcomes “active and reﬂexive agents capable of adaptive behaviour” 
(Joseph 2013, 39). The policies seem to be well placed for the goal of achieving resilience, 
but does it come with a paradox: with resilience, disaster risk reduction (DRR) actually 
invokes more disaster and endangerment? The idea of adaptation to the necessity of adversity 
and disaster has become crucial for developmental discourse, meaning that the subject of 
adaptation – the individual or the community – has to constantly work on itself and change 
(Alt 2013, 100). 
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4 Entrepreneurial resilience 
 
It is only recently that policy organisations have been vocal about resilience in economic 
terms. This chapter addresses this discursive development and shows that more than simply 
applying the idea of persisting in disaster to surviving from economic shocks, economic 
resilience is about active incentives to a specific kind of economic behaviour. In addition, in 
this case it is not a new solution to an old problem, but a new appearance for old tools. 
 
4.1 Economic resilience 
 
At the turn of the millennium, when international organisations – the UN ahead – first started 
to adopt resilience policies into their agendas, they were mostly concerned with resilience in 
terms of DRR or climate change adaptation (CCA). The UN has effectively mainstreamed 
DRR: for instance in 2013, UNISDR (2013) published a document where the roles of each 
UN organisation in DRR are described. However, despite a widespread emphasis on 
resilience in humanitarian crises, natural disasters and other ‘extreme events’, resilience is 
increasingly being applied to primarily economic issues on local, national and global levels. 
In addition to development agencies, resilience is currently a policy priority for explicitly 
economic and financial actors. 
 
To understand this shift it is important to remember that the current policy discourse rose 
from the ecological and environmental discourses. Sustainable development, as the leading 
paradigm of international development for the past two decades, has kept ecological and 
environmental concerns high on the international agenda. It is now well argued that 
development has long served the interests of liberal governance (see e.g. Mezzadra, Reid & 
Samaddar 2013, 2−3; Reid 2013a, 353; Duffield 2007). The doctrine of sustainable 
development – that some 20 years ago started to guide development to a less economic-
oriented and more environmentally conscious direction – has effectively given rise to and 
generated acceptance for a myriad of neoliberal policies and practices (Reid 2012a; Duffield 
2007). The proponents of sustainable development argued that focusing development on 
economic improvement would harm environment and compromise the sustainability of 
various environmental “life-support systems” that people rely on for comprehensive well-
being (Reid 2013a, 354). Resilience fits in this narrative because it is believed to help in 
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securing the long-term progress of development: “the [EU] Commission aims to establish a 
systematic and holistic approach to building resilience in crisis and risk-prone contexts, 
notably by supporting populations at risk to […] quickly recover from stresses and shocks 
without compromising long-term development prospects” (EC 2013b, 2). 
 
Given the above, it is no coincidence that economic organisations are suddenly very interested 
in promoting resilience or that development agencies emphasise economic resilience. WB 
(2013b, viii) concludes that resilient development “makes sense both from a poverty 
alleviation, as well as from an economic, perspective.” Resilience is the latest truth of 
sustainable development in its aim to reconcile the needs of economy and environment 
(Escobar 1996). There is indeed ever a tension to be solved because of what the WEF (2013a, 
17) calls the “interplay between stresses on the economic and environmental systems” that 
will challenge both global and national resilience. President of Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation Elizabeth Littlefield notes in her address to the WEF (2013b, 32): “Sustainability 
includes social, environmental and financial perspectives. It is not necessary to separate the 
charitable and profit-seeking sides of your brain. It is possible to both make money and help 
the planet.” So is it only, or primarily, because of ecological reason and concern for the life of 
the biosphere, effectively internalised by neoliberal discourses (Reid 2013a) why these 
different organisations are emphasising economic resilience? 
 
One thing to be considered is that the documents were produced either amid or in the 
aftermath of global economic and financial crises (WEF 2013b, 4; WB 2013a, 4; UNDP 
2011, 2) and some of the organisations, notably WB and WEF are explicitly economic actors. 
But there is also something else. Today, economic resilience is partly pursued in and of itself. 
Resilience has increasingly become to mean surviving in explicitly economic shocks and 
crises (UNDP 2011, xi). Household resilience is widely studied (ibid., 5), and national 
economies are evaluated in terms of resilience (WEF 2013a, 9), similarly to the wide-spread 
practice of stress tests for banks or national economies. It is very logical for governance to 
speak about economic resilience when there is an on-going economic crisis. If households, 
enterprises and states as economic actors only fell into despair or refused the shocks, 
economy would stagnate. Resilience gives people and states an urge to a fearless acceptance 
of the situation.  
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As previously discussed, while resilience is strongly attached to the concept of vulnerability, 
vulnerability itself is seen as a problem with “root causes” that need to be taken care of 
(USAID 2012, 14). On the one hand, poor communities are more likely to end up in situations 
where resilience is asked for. For instance, poor states have worse chances to get credit that 
would compensate for the economic losses at hand and enable the continued state provision of 
public goods and services (WB 2013a, 32; UNDP 2011, 10). On the other hand, it is viewed 
that “[w]ealthier states with stronger infrastructure and better-educated populations will be in 
a more advantageous position to deal with disaster and emergencies than poorer ones” 
(FEMA 2012, 3). There is a hierarchy of vulnerability laid between rich and poor states. 
When vulnerability depends on the wealth of the subject, it links with both economic 
resilience and environmental concerns: “Since poverty is believed to be a cause, as well as an 
effect, of environmental problems, growth is needed with the purpose of eliminating poverty 
and with the purpose, in turn, of protecting the environment” (Escobar 1996, 330).  
 
While all organisations express a concern about how the human objects of their policies will 
survive in economic hardships, some problematize household and state-level poverty on 
account of the organisation’s overall goals. Poverty may cut short progress made on 
development and reaching the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 2011, 3), and it can 
lead to an increasing dependence on outside aid (FEMA 2012, 9) and further increase 
vulnerability to economic shocks (UNDP 2011, xi), partly because people in low-income 
countries are less prepared (WB 2013a, 15), and “countries with the lowest risk preparation 
capacity generally have the highest poverty risk” (WB 2013b, 9).  
 
Poverty and lack of resilience form a vicious circle where both enforce each other, and “the 
urgent need to implement resilience —or adaptation— measures targeted towards the poor” is 
marketed even though its impact on poverty reduction is prospected only “beyond 2100” (WB 
2013b, 9). Hence, today’s poor are destined to stay in that category since their resilient 
behaviour is not contributing to their own wealth but to that of their descendants. It is one of 
the characteristics of contemporary biopolitics that life is posed as a problem for itself. 
Foucault (1990, 143) described this problematization by saying that “[f]or millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political 
existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in 
question”. Problematized is lack of resilience and poverty that causes it, not poverty as a 
political problem. In this case, when resilience is mainstreamed into policies of economic 
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development, it practically narrows rather than broadens the horizon for economic 
improvement in poor regions of the world. 
 
One of the reasons why liberalism as a governmental rationality has been hard to reject is its 
ability to project itself as natural in so far as it allows things to take their natural course and 
develop without interference (Foucault 2008, 15–17). People’s pursuit of this ‘natural 
interest’ will in a Smithian sense lead to the good of the whole population. Oksala (2013, 59) 
summarizes this naturalness in that “one of the most important ontological tenets of economic 
liberalism and neoliberalism is the doctrine of economic neutrality: economic facts are 
objective, universal and politically neutral”. Or as James McCarthy and Scott Prudham (2004, 
276) put it: “the hegemony of liberalism is made most evident by the ways in which 
profoundly political and ideological projects have successfully masqueraded as a set of 
objective, natural, and technocratic truisms.” Hereby anything that is argued in economic 
terms is politically neutral. As for resilience, this implies arguing that economic fluctuations 
are inevitable – and that adapting to them with appropriate resilience is an economic 
necessity. 
 
As it is clear that resilience functions according to a neoliberal logic and is now a vital part of 
its truth-telling power, should we be concerned of being fooled by neoliberal leaders who 
speak of economic necessity and “constantly repeat to us that the crisis is dire and our 
situation is desperate” (Hardt & Negri 2012)? Or is the promotion of economic resilience a 
demonstration of how “neoliberal economic argument has won in the governmental game of 
truth organised according to the undisputed, biopolitical value of life” and “the maximal 
material wellbeing of the population” (Oksala 2013, 61)? To answer these questions, the 
following section will look at what implications the observed economisation of the resilience 
discourse has on subjectivity. 
 
4.2 The entrepreneurial subject of resilience 
 
The policy discourse puts a heavy load of expectations onto the subject. Individual subjects 
and the communities they form are expected to think about future, prepare for shocks, and 
protect themselves and their property (FEMA 2012, 1; WB 2013a, 21). Building economic 
resilience is a task that everyone is expected to endorse. As already noted, economic 
resilience often focuses on the household (UNDP 2011, 5). Taking the household as the point 
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of departure indicates that the main target of building adaptive capacity and thereby economic 
resilience is to affect individual behaviour. Households are expected, among other things, to 
empower women, and given incentives to do their own risk mapping and preparations (WB 
2013a, 23, 40). As is the case with neoliberal governmentality in general, resilience in 
particular does not mean a reduced interference with the population, on the contrary. 
Resilience functions by embracing the ability of individuals and collectivities to absorb and 
withstand disturbance, which may lead to the thought that governance is distant and we 
should take up agency by being resilient. As biopolitics problematizes the life of the subject, 
self-government “extends to cover the way in which an individual questions his or her own 
conduct (or problematizes it) so that he or she may be better able to govern it” (Dean 2010, 
19, emphasis in the original).  
 
Resilience is for neoliberalism a collection of truths it can use to specific ends in the same 
way as modern power relations in general increasingly work “through the specified freedoms 
of modern subjectification” (Dillon 2013, 167), including the creation of a resilient 
subjectivity. Resilience exemplifies how current neoliberal economic rationalities are brought 
into any domain of life; anything can be an object of economic analysis (Foucault 2008, 268). 
Today, economist Gary Becker’s thoughts are explicitly used by WB (2013a, 21) in a 
reference to his A Treatise on the Family where households are described as “little factories” 
participating in an exchange of goods and services, and investing in their members with 
specific expectations on outputs. WB has throughout its existence aimed at effecting 
economic behaviour, and resilience makes no exception. 
 
Expectations on individuals and households are not points of a program on how to become 
resilient. They are “practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, 
desires, aspirations, needs, wants, and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Dean 2010, 20). 
They are part of a process of subjection where the resilient subject is constructed, a subject 
that allegedly has capacity to handle economic difficulties. Speaking in the early 1980s of the 
long-term aims of his research, Foucault noted that he had tried to “create a history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 2000, 
326). Foucault studied both liberalism and neoliberalism as a governmentality “in which 
people are governed and govern themselves” (Read 2009, 29). In The Birth of Biopolitics 
(Foucault 2008), Foucault paid a lot of attention to the effects of neoliberalism on the subject 
of economic man, homo œconomicus. In the concept of homo œconomicus we encounter an 
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early idea of today’s resilient subject. Foucault (ibid., 269) refers to Becker’s works when 
concluding that 
 
Homo œconomicus is someone who accepts reality. Rational conduct is any conduct which is 
sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a 
non-random way, and economics can therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature 
of responses to environmental variables. 
 
The economic man as someone who accepts reality translates very well into the current 
resilience discourse. Walker and Salt (2006) have theorised this acceptance of reality as a part 
of what they term ‘resilience thinking’, a term that unlike many other definitions is not a 
description of a system’s capacity but an applied framework to think about governing these 
systems in the right way. Walker and Salt emphasise the importance of understanding “how 
the world really works”, which is as complex adaptive social-ecological systems where 
people and nature are intimately linked. A system that accepts reality is one that appreciates 
the changes brought about by the “adaptive cycle” that each system moves through. The 
repeated cycle means that change is inevitable, though not predictable or linear. (Ibid., 4, 
113.) Those systems most open to the option that change entails, in other words those that 
best accept reality, will be most successful, the most resilient. 
 
That the economic agencies (WB and WEF) are busy presenting tools with which individuals 
or households can enhance their economic resilience is a reflection of the “risk landscape” 
that they see now determines our lives (Evans 2013, 35). If there was no risk, resilience would 
be out of demand. These actors have found ways to portray and even categorise risks if not 
predict them (Evans 2013, 36−37; WEF 2013a). Risk and resilience are intimately connected 
in risk management, which is 
 
[…] the process of confronting risks, preparing for them, and coping with their effects. […] 
Much of the emerging literature on risk in a development context emphasizes the important role 
that risk management can play in increasing resilience to negative shocks. However, to increase 
prosperity and well-being, risk management also has an essential role in helping people and 
countries successfully manage positive shocks. (WB 2013a, 12.) 
 
Managing risk is correlated with increased resilience to various shocks. What this passage 
interestingly points out is that the shock can be both positive and negative, and managing the 
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positive ones increases resilience to the negative ones. In the policy analysis, positive shock is 
synonymous with opportunity. Opportunity is “the possibility of gain” (WB 2013a, 11), 
which implies a strategic benefit in confronting the shocks. Economic considerations intersect 
with the original ecological tenets of resilience according to which living systems “develop 
not on account of their ability to secure themselves prophylactically from threats, but through 
their adaptation to them. They evolve in spite of and because of systemic shocks.” (Evans & 
Reid 2014, 30.)  
 
The positivity of shock echoes thoughts of classical neoliberal thinkers such as Friedrich von 
Hayek, for whom “the complexity of the market required […] optimising the conditions for 
self-organisation and adaptive evolution. As an open, complex system the economy evolved 
most effectively in far from equilibrium conditions”. (Zebrowski 2013, 10−11.) Walker and 
Salt (2006) draw on another economist, Joseph Schumpeter, and the idea of ‘creative 
destruction’. They claim that as a system moves along the adaptive cycle to the release phase, 
“linkages are broken, and natural, social, and economic capital leaks out the system. […] But 
the destruction that ensues has a creative element.” (Ibid., 77−78.) The logic goes that since 
systems can’t stay in the conservation phase forever and change will inevitably occur, it is 
better to embrace than deny it. The subject’s function is to be a risk manager and an 
opportunist. When capital is released for experimentation and new beginnings, it is “the time 
of greatest potential for the initiation of either destructive or creative change” (ibid., 82). As 
Reid (2013a, 363) notes, resilience discourse constructs disasters not as threats to be 
categorically avoided but as “events of profound ‘opportunity’ for societies to transform 
themselves economically and politically”. 
 
Resilience thus invites to embrace risk – not to enjoy the suffering it might entail but to seize 
opportunities that lie in ‘far from equilibrium conditions’. Approaching risk can even be a 
business opportunity, as “European companies, including SMEs [small and medium-sized 
enterprises], can be early first movers in developing climate-resilient products and services 
and grasp business opportunities worldwide” (EC 2013a, 5). For the resilient subject, risk and 
opportunity go hand in hand (O’Malley 2013; 190−193) so that resilience constitutes “an 
opportunity for transformation, in terms of adaptation to changing environments, 
empowerment, improved livelihoods and economic opportunities” (EC 2013b, 3). Economic 
and development organisations are concerned that households and economies which lack 
resilience will be averse to confront risks and thereby resort to “adverse coping mechanisms” 
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(UNDP 2011, 5) that further worsen their situation and compromise development gains 
achieved so far. The WB (2013a, 4) reminds how shocks “play a major role in pushing 
households below the poverty line and keeping them there”, but also that while “a negative 
shock can push them into destitution, bankruptcy, or crisis, poor people may stick with 
technologies and livelihoods that appear relatively safe but are also stagnant.” In 
neoliberalism, economic failure has often been attributed to a personal failure to enhance 
human capital (Harvey 2007, 34), which in the current discourse is the same as a lack of 
resilience. 
 
The resilience of homo œconomicus is also to a great extent about an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’. 
Foucault noted that homo œconomicus is not, as in classical liberalism, a man of exchange, 
but an entrepreneur of himself (Foucault 2008, 225−226). In the resilience discourse, 
entrepreneurs are agents able to seize the opportunity when it occurs and lead a system to a 
growth phase (Walker & Salt 2006, 114−115). Although resilience scientists have attached 
resilience with short-term losses on efficiency and long-term profits of not undergoing regime 
change, economic agencies now speak of resilient dynamism that is supposed to enable 
“tackling immediate problems and long-term challenges at the same time” (WEF 2013b, 4). 
In economics, it becomes important to be resilient and dynamic at the same time. It is not 
about trying to maximize efficiency and profit but to rise up to each new occasion despite 
economic uncertainties. The WEF (2013b, 4) talks about resilient dynamism and “the 
importance of strategic agility, the ability not only to manage risk but also to adapt to its 
permanence and unfathomable variability”.  
 
Now, at the latest, it is clear that what is pursued is not some toolbox where you draw a tool 
for each disturbance that requires resilience – which is something policy actors should aim at 
if they want to have a positive effect on the lives of people who face economic problems. 
Instead, pursued is a mindset that the subject is supposed to internalize, a way of “seeing the 
world through a resilience lens” (Walker & Salt 2006, 117). When the subject becomes its 
own enterprise, a call to embrace risk becomes a call to invest in ‘human capital’ (Alt 2013, 
94). The analysis shows that the real effect of economic resilience in the policies is to 
condition the subject to accept economic problems, even poverty, by relying on its 
entrepreneurial spirit. Although economic resilience is a lot about own initiative, it is in 
essence not about surviving on your own but integrating into the system as an entrepreneur; 
self-reliance is then to be exhibited when the system works badly (ibid., 97). 
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Some agencies see a need to create a culture of resilience where entrepreneurial skills are 
taught forward and where people grow up into resiliency (WEF 2013b, 17, 26; FEMA 2012, 
14). What should we make of this policy that promotes self-reliance and encourages everyone 
to be so to speak the master of their own fate? This is a process of subjectivation where the 
subject is portrayed not only resilient, but also responsible. Resilience and responsibility is a 
tricky pair. The resilient subject is supposed to act like an entrepreneur who is alone 
responsible for his living and for sensing changes in the environment that require adaptation. 
Also, the entrepreneur is ‘free’ to organise work the way he wants and can take advantage 
from changes rather than blocking them out. What the entrepreneur might lose in efficiency 
he might gain in resilience and robustness (WEF 2013b, 17). Are resilient subjects then more 
autonomous if they can take individual initiative and influence innovations and projects in 
their local community (FEMA 2012, 14; WEF 2013b, 24)? Or are they simply left on their 
own, forced to be self-reliant? As it was important to pay attention to the “generalization of 
the grid of homo œconomicus to domains that are not immediately and directly economic” 
(Foucault 2008, 268), it is important to see how the entrepreneurial subject of resilience 
reaches us from various directions, hoping to work on the group level to make us less risk 
averse (WB 2013a, 25). 
 
Economic resilience can be part, among other things, of poverty reduction, equality of 
opportunities, or women’s empowerment (EC 2013b, 3; WB 2013a, 23), all of which aim for 
better economic conditions. These are all positive objects. Yet, even if they are just blueprints 
whose connection with reality remains to be seen, they are always discursive tools with power 
effects. Maurizio Lazzarato (2012, 54) pointed out in his discussion on capitalism that every 
“economic, political, or social mechanism produces effects of power specific to it, requires 
specific tactics and strategies, and affects the “governed” according to different processes of 
subjection and subjugation”. We have already looked at the process of subjection in economic 
resilience. Now it is time to look for the different power relations that the subject falls into 
when trying to be economically resilient.  
 
4.3 Economically responsible behaviour 
 
The preceding analysis showed that economic resilience strives for a subject ready to take 
risks or at least accepts their presence in order to gain opportunity. This subject is more 
proactive than the adaptive subject of disaster resilience; it endorses both “fundamental goals 
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of and motivations for risk management: that is, resilience in the face of adverse events and 
prosperity through the pursuit of opportunities” (WB 2013a, 11). These characteristics go 
very well together with expectations that global economy and job markets currently pose 
against people all around the world. What are the motives behind this variation of resilience? 
Is economic resilience driven by a concern for people and their well-being amid economic 
turbulences or more by a concern for the functioning of the system as such? Joseph (2013), 
among others, has claimed that resilience has risen to prominence because it neatly fits the 
requirements of global neoliberal governmentality. 
 
Foucault (2008, 270) described the homo œconomicus of liberalism as someone who is 
“manageable” and “eminently governable”. Economic man was in his view someone whose 
behaviour could be directed by techniques of governance. The policy analysis shows that 
when resilience is promoted as a way of approaching disasters or economic shocks, more 
sophisticated aims are included in the message. Some of these further goals that extend 
merely surviving different disturbances are macroeconomic sustainability, competitiveness, 
poverty reduction and human development (WEF 2013b, 5; UNDP 2014, 10; WB 2013b, 
viii). It is argued that “versions of resilience are being mobilised to facilitate archetypal 
governmental technologies of neoliberalism; government at a distance, technologies of 
responsibilisation, and practices of subjectiﬁcation that produce suitably prudent autonomous 
and entrepreneurial subjects” (Welsh 2014, 2). This would mean that resilience as a policy 
concept is not a tool to find solutions, but a tool with which to highlight the problem, and to 
confirm pre-given solutions. But in order to consider the claim that what resilience really does 
is to make us fit for neoliberal economy (Joseph 2013; Reid 2013a), we need to look at what, 
according to the discourse, is central in building resilience: existence and availability of 
financial tools and insurance. 
 
Insurance is a technology that protects against losses. The relation of resilience and insurance 
is thus logical, as insurance can be used to build resilience towards risk. Insurance has been 
understood as a technology of governance long before resilience became a dominant 
discourse around which the question of insurance now situates itself. Francois Ewald (1991) 
theorised insurance as a technology of risk; risk being not a particular danger but an 
arrangement and a mode of treating those dangers collectively in a population. Risk, 
according to Ewald, is a calculable possibility of loss against which the insurer guarantees an 
compensation (ibid., 201, 204). What constitutes a risk is then a result of social and political 
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processes, because “[n]othing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality”, and yet “anything 
can be a risk” (ibid., 199). 
 
The available forms of insurance at a given time are determined by an “insurantial imaginary” 
of the insurer (ibid., 198), which again is depended on the collective “imaginary of threat” 
(Evans 2013) that prevails in a society. Although often neglected by security studies, 
insurance closely links with national security as security experts are continuously screening 
and mapping the dangers against which insurance might be needed and thus create a market 
for insurers (Aradau & van Munster 2008, 2−3). The policy discourse of UNDP and WB in 
particular promotes insurance because it is seen as one way of building the capacity to 
withstand and absorb the disturbances that according to these imaginaries and probability 
calculations can face anybody and particularly those deemed somehow vulnerable. Lack of 
insurance or of an access to it is problematic from a resilience point of view (WB 2013a, 14, 
16). Resilience policies are very coherent that this problem most strongly concerns the poor, 
“because poor households have fewer assets, more limited risk-coping mechanisms, and less 
access to capital markets to help them cope with economic fluctuations” (UNDP 2011, 5). 
 
The power of insurance is not only in its ability to decide on the faith of subjects but in the 
way it ensures the continuation of social and economic processes (Ewald 1991, 208−210). 
The establishment of insurance partly replaced political struggle over juridical responsibility 
of losses (ibid., 201−202). Likewise, resilience is more concerned with the consequences that 
inevitable disasters have on the development gains of populations and households, or on 
national economies, than on who or what caused them and how they could be prevented. 
Discussing resilience as a framework for understanding, Welsh (2014, 6) asks if 
foregrounding “the where, when and how of change-inducing events” happens at the expense 
of considering why they take place. As a way of building resilience, insurance helps in 
recovering and moving forward towards new opportunities without searching for responsible 
ones. Indeed, resilience is described as an ability to survive both internal mistakes and 
external shocks (WEF 2013b, 19). 
 
Rather than being a form of solidarity and provided by state or employer (Ewald 1991), 
insurance today is planned on the level of population but provided individually. Insurance of 
course requires capital – both the capital to be insured and with which to pay for the insurance 
– and is therefore said to divide more than unite (Aradau & van Munster 2008; Duffield 2007) 
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since only the wealthy have access to it. It is no wonder that poor countries invest less in 
insurance and register far smaller rates in usage of financial tools than wealthy countries (WB 
2013a, 28). But resilience policies problematize these facts as well as the observed “risk-
averse” (ibid., 8) and “adverse” (UNDP 2011, 5) practices that the poor are using instead. 
Again, acknowledging the local does not mean respecting local practices. Insurance is also a 
moral technology to “conduct one’s life in a manner of an enterprise”, thereby “transforming 
one’s relationship with nature, the world and God so that, even in misfortune, one retains 
responsibility for one’s affairs by possessing the means to repair its effects” (Ewald 1991, 
207). The poor might not have money for full-scale insurance but the states they live in 
should at least make it available. Some risks are categorised as “idiosyncratic”, “breakdowns 
in processes” or “human error” (WB 2013a, 5: WEF 2013a, 36), which means one can 
diminish or prevent them. But others are “systemic”, “exogenous” or “global” (ibid.) and out 
of the reach of individuals, which is why insurance and resilience are supposedly needed. 
 
While the insurance industry is not focusing on causes, resilience’s scope is broader: it is keen 
to understand differences in preparedness (UNDP 2014, 1) and to find out what other ways 
there are to become resilient. The resilience discourse has even brought with it models on how 
to calculate economic resilience (see e.g. Rose 2004) and how to conduct a “national 
resilience measurement” (WEF 2013a). Along with insurance, another thing supposedly 
crucial for resilience is the existence of financial markets and financial capacities of the state 
(WB 2013a, 27; EC 2013a, 10). WB (2013a, 16) makes this explicit: 
 
[…] why aren’t people and societies better at managing risk? Although the specific answer 
varies from case to case, it is always related to the obstacles and constraints facing individuals 
and societies, including lack of resources and information, cognitive and behavioral failures, 
missing markets and public goods, and social and economic externalities. 
 
The quote shows that resilience policies are not directed exclusively to the so-called poor 
populations but to state authorities in those countries and in donor countries, as well as to 
development organisations and private businesses that should help in establishing markets for 
financial tools. 
 
According to the organisations, resilience can be enhanced by being economically responsible 
in the way described above – practically by taking credit and insuring yourself and your 
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property. Financial tools may be remedies against risk, but they do not come without power 
relations. Lazzarato (2012) has proposed that what we commonly call finance is a system that 
practically forces us into an indefinite relation of indebtedness. As risk and insurance can 
produce debt, resilience policies can be seen as further enforcing this relation. The 
subjectivity that comes about from this relation is for Lazzarato the “indebted man” (ibid.). 
The indebted man is ostensibly free but in effect “his actions, his behaviour, are confined to 
the limits defined by the debt he has entered into” (ibid., 14). From an affirmative perspective, 
using financial tools enables action and “liberates man from fear” and “multiplies wealth” 
(Ewald 1991, 208). Nevertheless, these minor liberative voices are undermined by the 
stronger catastrophic tonalities of the current discourse. 
  
So is resilience, as Duffield (2007, 218) put it, the development of a division of people into 
“insured” and “non-insured” life, a division that is meant to persist rather than be overcome? 
The insured life can be relatively worriless in terms of emergencies and instabilities. The non-
insured life does not have this luxury but has to take whatever loss occurs. Resilience is then 
the promised cure for the non-insured people who cannot protect themselves from hardships. 
If we wish to be economically dynamic and realise our creativity, are we forced into debt and 
insurance? Resilience indisputably supports behaviour, processes and institutions that are 
central in advanced neoliberal economies. WEF, for example, directly draws on prominent 
resilience scholars when sketching national resilience indicators (WEF 2013a, 44). The 
relation between resilience and neoliberalism is a very compatible one; although resilience did 
not derive from economics, its models are suited to fit economic actors and processes (Walker 
& Salt 2006). 
 
Worth noting is that although Lazzarato talks about forced indebtedness, it is an indirect 
enforcement. That is indeed how biopolitical governance works: not by forcing or disciplining 
but by working through ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1988, 18) and by ‘governing at a 
distance’ (Miller & Rose 1990). Lemke (2013, 37) has observed that 
 
[s]tudies of governmentality have been extremely helpful in illuminating the “soft” or 
“empowering” mechanisms of power, demonstrating in what ways individuals and social groups 
are governed by freedom and choice. They have successfully exposed the paradoxes of 
“controlled autonomy” in neoliberal governmentality and the intimate relationship that exists 
between the universal call for “self-determination” and quite specific societal expectations and 
institutional constraints. 
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If resilience has a strategy to direct people’s behaviour, it is responsibilisation, a technology 
of power ingrained in the discourse. The discursive process of responsibilisation works by 
convincing the audience of both the necessity of building resilience and the fault of not doing 
so. The core message: resilience is required for the wellbeing of individuals, households and 
societies – and failing to invest in resilience now can be costly in the future (WB 2013a, 16; 
UNDP 2014, 3). WEF (2013b, 18) goes even further by claiming that “[t]o strengthen 
personal resilience requires training, reflection and a sense of duty to oneself to be healthy, 
productive, alert and responsible”. Thus resilience’s promise to give “the freedom to live a 
life that one values and to manage one’s affairs adequately” (UNDP 2014, 7) is always a 
conditioned freedom. The indebted man is in a continuous debt relation, and with insurance 
accepts the idea of ever more risk and danger. The indebted man is a true neoliberal subject. 
 
Making resilience a responsibility or a duty of the individual is part of the wider development 
of neoliberal governmentality that is moralizing and includes the transfer of responsibilities 
from state to people (Joseph 2013, 41; Lazzarato 2012, 3, 48).  In the analysis, though, states 
are also given incentives and reminded of their responsibility to build national resilience so 
they can enhance people’s preparedness, and pump in resources when in crisis. This can help 
individuals and communities if they do not have the necessary material means. In the end, 
individual resilience in terms of economic dynamism and finding opportunities in risk can 
truly bring a fortune (WEF 2013b, 16), for “risk-takers are, after all, the serious money-
makers” (Evans 2013, 74). It is perfectly understandable why resilience has penetrated the 
policies of different organisations that simply see it as the best framework for their work. It 
would be too expensive to build a society from scratch after a blow every couple of years. 
 
So far, resilience in the policies has, broadly speaking, had two variations: adaptive resilience 
and entrepreneurial resilience. The policies indicate resilience should help in disasters and 
economic difficulties, but in effect the discourse functions to the contrary. Disaster and crisis 
have become endemic and there is no way out from their negative effects, which one can 
either adapt to or exploit in so far as they bring new opportunities. The current, strongly 
neoliberal discursive framing basically rules out the positive practical application of resilience 
as a policy tool. 
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5 Governing life globally through resilience 
 
Even though resilience clearly functions according to a neoliberal logic, in some ways it can 
feel common sense. But only looking at the immediate benefits or losses from subscribing to 
resilience-building, or considering the wider targets of human development, poverty reduction 
or risk management, would be to overlook the depth of the discourse. In this chapter, some 
ontological features of resilience and how the policies work as part of global governance is 
discussed. The chapter clarifies that the discourse has effects beyond the specific contexts in 
which a policy is formed. What are the consequent political implications and are we ready to 
accept them? 
 
5.1 The complex operating environment 
 
As the policy discourse is examined from a biopolitical perspective, this is not asking what 
the world is like in reality but asking how life and politics are understood in resilience.  
Various disciplines, most importantly natural sciences and mathematics, have long purported 
an understanding of reality in non-linear, systemic terms. Complexity is an important concept 
which has coined both the internal behaviour and the interaction of a system with its 
environment. Here, the system can be any “set of inter-related elements”, and “a complex 
system is one in which […] the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Byrne & Callaghan 
2014, 4). Also, the environment in question can refer to “all aspects of reality outside the 
system and with which it has relationships, although it is clear that the more specific usage of 
‘natural environment’ is one which is very generally a source of external perturbation in 
human systems” (Byrne 1998, 30−31). These systems are continuously changing, and the 
change can be caused by both external factors and internal fluctuations (ibid.). 
 
Complex systems analyses and other ideas from traditional sciences “have been presented as 
the basis of a conceptual tool bag for the development of a complexity-founded approach to 
social science” (Byrne 1998, 34), often with great success. A search into the use of 
complexity theory in social sciences showed that it has been “of particular importance in 
relation to management in all its aspects, to governance and public administration […] and to 
the interface between the social and the natural considered in ecological terms” (Byrne & 
Callaghan 2014, 2). Complexity theory has made its way into international relations (e.g. 
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Hoffman 2003) and global politics (e.g. Harrison [ed.] 2006). Given that, it is hardly 
surprising how widely the ideas of complex systems thinking have spread in the policies of 
actors that were the object of this analysis. These actors are involved in management and 
governance, and resilience as such is never independent of these other functions. 
 
Rather than an explanatory theory with models of causation, complexity theory in social 
sciences means “a framework for understanding which asserts the ontological position that 
much of the world and most of the social world consists of complex systems and if we want to 
understand it we have to understand it in those terms” (Byrne & Callaghan 2014, 8). In the 
mainstream resilience discourse, complexity is one of the ontological premises – one of its 
truths. As noted in the previous chapter, understanding “how the world really works” starts 
from the premise that it consists of interlinked systems of human and nature that do not 
function as separate realms (Walker & Salt 2006, 4). In this view, systems are difficult if not 
impossible to manage by means of optimisation because social-ecological systems are 
inherently complex, adaptive, interconnected, with changing forms and largely unpredictable 
behaviour (ibid., 29−32). The ideal framework for analyses of a world of complex systems is, 
of course, resilience (Folke 2006), or ‘resilience thinking’ (Walker & Salt 2006; Folke et al. 
2010). 
 
Despite different emphases of resilience (disaster, economic, environmental, climate, 
infrastructure or other), all organisations share these ontological premises that form the truth 
basis on which the policy discourse is built. The world and the times that we live in are 
described as complex, uncertain, and interconnected (FEMA 2012, 6; WEF 2013b, 14; UNDP 
2014, ii). Crises and disturbances are regarded as a systemic feature, not an anomaly (UNDP 
2011, 2). WB even refers to Greek philosopher Heraklitus to conclude that “the only thing 
constant is change. And with change comes uncertainty.” (WB 2013a, 10.) Complexity is not 
only an implicit ontology but used to describe how the present and the future appear to the 
agencies that are supposed to manage them (EC 2013b, 1; WB 2013a, 19; WEF 2013b, 18). 
Understanding resilience necessitates understanding complexity. 
 
One of the basic features of the complex systems of resilience is multifarious and dynamic 
interaction across temporal and spatial scales (Folke 2006, 258−259). In social sciences this 
kind of a system is often described as a network where its various nodes are interconnected 
and communicate with each other. Increased interconnectedness enhanced by the huge 
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developments in information technology and the consequent changes in social and economic 
spheres have inspired theories of the network society (Castells 2005; van Dijk 2006) where 
connectivity is everything. As for resilience, connectivity is an ontological feature of complex 
systems and connectedness a prerequisite for building the resilience of these systems. Chris 
Zebrowski (2009) aptly described the task of resilience as “governing the network society”. 
FEMA (2012, 13) argues one of the essential capabilities of a resilient emergency 
management community is to “[p]ractice omni-directional knowledge sharing” to improve the 
connectivity of networks and to engage the public as an information source. In order to be 
resilient, the system has to maximise its connections and information; risks can be seen 
positively if it is thought that eliminating them “would deprive many systems of the benefits 
of interconnectedness” (WEF 2013b, 28). Indeed, connectivity and connectedness has usually 
been a question of quantity and concerned with the information gap between peoples, between 
“the Connected” and the rest, thus constituting subjectivity around life’s connectivity (Reid 
2009).  
 
Arguing on the basis of systems’ and peoples’ connective properties is one expression of the 
biopolitics of resilience. Responsible for the radical interconnectedness that is seen to both 
enrich and endanger our lives is to a large extent technology. The effort of making 
government and international agencies resilient has been enhanced by “the development of 
emerging technologies that advance emergency management capabilities” (FEMA 2012, 18). 
Resilience is pursued by “both hard and soft technologies, such as more resilient construction 
materials or early warning systems” (EC 2013b, 5−6). The need to implement scenario 
planning, early warning, crisis monitoring, needs assessment and other tools for the 
Connected to gather and share information rises from a concern for the truths deriving from 
the complex ontology of resilience: uncertainty and unpredictability. FEMA (2012), for 
example, presents them as fundamental features of our “operating environments” that pose a 
challenge for crisis management. Yet, great technological effort is made to render knowable 
even a bit of what is to come, because “the unknowable is precisely that which is dangerous in 
a world of radically interconnected circulation” (Evans 2013, 171). 
 
The WEF (2013b, 37) recognises that “[u]nlike an object, […] systems are too complex for 
mathematical calculations to predict the stresses that might arise”. In spite of advocating 
unpredictability of present and future, the policy discourse includes many ideas on how to 
mitigate uncertainty and enhance decision-making. This is most evident in FEMA’s Strategic 
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Foresight Initiative (SFI) that is supposed to give clues on how to prepare the nation for the 
future, despite the assertion that “emergency management community faces increasing 
complexity and decreasing predictability in its operating environment” (FEMA 2012, 2). 
While the non-linear and emergent behaviour of complex systems deny attempts to predict 
future, “scenario planning offers a robust structure for thinking about alternative—and 
plausible—future operating environments” (ibid., 4). With knowledge of possible futures and 
drivers that affect their realisation, approaches like “robust decision-making” try to overcome 
the problem of uncertainty “by identifying decisions that are robust across a wide range of 
potential futures” (WB 2013b, 16). 
 
The use of complexity in natural and social sciences should not be undermined because it has 
clearly “provided a fertile bed for resilience theory to ﬂower” (Welsh 2014, 1). The relation of 
complexity and resilience is ambiguous, and it can be asked if the integration of complexity 
into the discourse is instrumental for legitimating resilience policies rather than complexity 
somehow preceding resilience ontologically. Also, the consequent emergence of “‘complex 
adaptive system’ (CAS) as an ontological category” (ibid., 4) should be critically analysed. 
First, there is the problematic “presumption of the ontological soundness of ‘the system’ as a 
functionally integrated community of objects and agents” (ibid.) that is expressed also in the 
policies (e.g. WEF 2013b, 37) and second, “the assumptions of sufﬁcient commonalities 
between economic, social and ecological ‘complex systems’ to justify the translation of 
theory and models between them” (Welsh 2014, 4).  
 
Focusing on systems as units of analysis and resilience as their primary attribute may reduce 
“human life to the properties and capacities that deﬁne non-human bodies and non-human 
living species and systems” (Evans & Reid 2013, 87) and imbue systems “with an ontological 
permanence that oversimpliﬁes the very complexity of life such research aims to capture” 
(Welsh 2014, 7). Systems thinking can obfuscate the effects the discourse of resilience as 
complexity has on the parts of the ‘system’. Joseph (2013, 43) argues that “although resilience 
appears at ﬁrst sight as a systems theory”, its policy applications merely make brief reference 
to their social-ecological origins and in effect emphasise the unit level. Welsh (2014, 8), for 
his part, is concerned with the “unintended consequences arising from the totalising effects of 
a complex systems discourse colonising a wide range of academic disciplines”. He concludes: 
“the inherent danger is that policy and academic analysis becomes concerned with 
understanding and maintaining a system shorn of political context or attention to questions of 
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power and inequality” (ibid., 7). Walker and Cooper observe how “[a]lmost by definition, 
complex systems internationalize and neutralize all external challenges to their existence” 
(Walker & Cooper 2011, 157) so that questions of power are excluded from the political 
agenda in advance. 
 
5.2 Resilience as global governance 
 
Resilience has become a means to manage systems in uncertainty and complexity (Berkes 
2007; Folke et al. 2002, 238). The popularity of resilience among the actors of the policy 
analysis should come as no surprise, since in a complex and contingent world, “theoretical 
frameworks that promise a means of capturing that complexity are seductive” (Welsh 2014, 
1). Ecological resilience is strongly contributing to the idea that although social-ecological 
systems cannot be controlled or shielded from disturbing external influences, they can be 
governed if their inherent vulnerability is recognised and resilience strengthened (e.g. Chapin 
et al. 2010; Folke et al. 2011). Social-ecological resilience fits into the policies of both 
national and international organisations as they are concerned with systems of people, 
economy, and environment. Resilience seems to provide a way of solving problems of 
governing the respective systems when nothing is certain and “no one is in control” (Walker 
& Salt 2006, 29). The connection between resilience and governance becomes clear from the 
Stockholm Resilience Centre, which announces to advance “research on the governance of 
social-ecological systems with a special emphasis on resilience” and generate “new and 
elaborated insights and means for the development of management and governance practices” 
(SRC 2012). The question put forward in this section is: to what extent is the discourse 
concerned with improving international cooperation or global governance, and does resilience 
help in this regard? 
 
As discussed in the introduction, “breadth of ﬁelds in which a resilience approach of some 
sort is now structuring government policy and practice is extensive” (Welsh 2014, 5). In this 
policy analysis alone, resilience is discursively connected to human development (UNDP 
2014, 7), poverty reduction (EC 2013b, 3), DRR (USAID 2012, 13), humanitarian assistance 
(USAID 2012), sustainability (WEF 2013b, 5), environmental shocks (UNDP 2011, 3) and 
climate change adaptation (EC 2013a, 5). The list could be continued. We see that resilience 
permeates many distinct policy fields but it is noteworthy that outside of its origins in 
 52 
 
ecology, it is rarely an intrinsic value, although it may often look like that as it gains ground 
from other policy concepts. 
 
Harmonisation of policies along the dominant neoliberal resilience rhetoric risks reducing or 
negating positive effects of many once distinct policy arenas (see Walker & Cooper 2011, 
144). Reponses to various problems, be they security concerns or questions of wellbeing 
stagnate if the quick-fix solution “be resilient” continues to be repeated like a mantra. 
Psychological resilience is gaining in importance also in contexts where social-ecological 
resilience has prevailed, causing a mixture of the two. Resilience as a policy concept should 
translate into practical solutions, tools or frameworks with which organisations or their target 
communities can face their problems. As a byword resilience gets huge attention but remains 
abstract. 
 
What is more, resilience does not merely mark a tool for these distinct policies but affects 
discourses and practices of global governance. Chandler, discussing ‘resilience thinking’ 
rather than systemic resilience, has argued that “if resilience is to be defined, it would perhaps 
be useful to understand resilience as the discursive field through which we negotiate the 
emerging problem of governing complexity” (Chandler 2014b, 13). As Foucault (1981, 53, 
55) noted, “discourse is the power which is to be seized” and which as a practice of truth 
“relies on institutional support”. We need to ask if “[r]esilience is best understood as the 
rolling-out of neoliberal governmentality (Joseph 2013, 51) or if it is “a radical critique of the 
knowledge claims of actually existing neoliberalism”, calling forth “a new ‘resilience’ agenda 
of governance” (Chandler 2014a, 47−48). 
 
Academic debate goes on whether resilience is the heightening or climax of neoliberal 
governmentality. Recalling Foucault’s ideas on governmentality, as a form of power it is not 
about the sovereign, disciplining and administrative state; not about “the state’s takeover 
(étatisation) of society” but about “the “governmentalization” of the state” (Foucault 2007, 
109). Governmentality studies have showed that neoliberal governmentality has meant a 
reduced role for the state, but not an eradication of it, and not less governance (Donzelot & 
Gordon 2008, 53). On the contrary, governance through economic analysis has extended to 
domains traditionally held outside of economy and government (Foucault 2007; 2008). 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009, 205) would call it Empire: “characterised by a 
distribution of powers, […] which requires the wide collaboration of dominant nation states, 
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major corporations, supranational economic and political institutions, various NGOs, media 
conglomerates, and as series of other powers”. Obviously, all actors of the analysis fit this 
description. 
 
To understand the meaning of resilience as part of global governance we need to look back a 
little. Post-cold war development was dominated by the idea that for development to occur 
there has to be security, and for security to last there has to be development. This 
development-security nexus dominated the international development agenda throughout the 
1990s (Duffield 2010). The logic goes that conditions for market economy and economic 
growth will bring stability and security and thus consolidate neoliberalism’s sphere of 
influence. Resilience, then, was soon understood to be a crucial aspect of sustainable 
development and a widely used concept in “sustainability science” (Folke et al. 2002; Brand 
2009). Reid (2013a, 360) concludes that resilience lies in the interface between sustainability 
and neoliberal forms of governing, “conceived not simply as an inherent property of the 
biosphere, in need of protection from the economic development of humanity, but a property 
within human populations that now needed promoting through the increase of their “economic 
options.”” Using ecological reason for installing neoliberal governance is evident from the 
managerial discourse of global environmentalism (Nikula 2012). It problematizes the 
sustainability of the global ecosystem, “the ‘global’ being defined according to a perception 
of the world shared by those who rule it” (ibid., 58), namely those invoking a future with 
environmental catastrophe. As briefly discussed in chapter 3.3, resilience scientists have taken 
on the parallel concerns for environment and governance and have come up with ideas of 
‘planetary’ or ‘ecological’ stewardship, approaches claiming to both recognise planetary 
boundaries, sustain ecosystem services and support human well-being (Chapin et al. 2010; 
Folke et al. 2011). 
 
Reflecting this critique of resilience with the policy analysis, points of contact can be seen. 
There seems to be a moral consensus on the need for governance at international and global 
levels (EC 2013b, 4; UNDP 2014, ii; UNDP 2011, 5; USAID 2012, 5; WB 2013a, 34). Klaus 
Schwab, the Founder and Executive Chairman of WEF, was quoted in the report: “The risks 
have not gone away. What we should do is develop the necessary resilience to deal with those 
risks in time. […] Without a basic moral consensus on a global level, humankind cannot 
survive.” (WEF 2013b, 19.) A clear tendency is to portray the world in such a way that it is in 
need of more, not less governance, meaning increased cooperation, coordination, 
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standardization and “multistakeholder” approaches (EC 2013a, 9; USAID 2012, 23; WB 
2013a, 35). UNDP is surprisingly explicit: 
 
Reducing vulnerability to transnational threats, whether by fixing governance architectures to reduce 
shocks or taking steps to enable people to cope, requires greater leadership and cooperation among 
states and across international organisations. It also requires a more coherent approach that sets 
priorities and reduces spillovers—and more-systematic engagement with civil society and the private 
sector. […] Global governance tends to be organized in silos, with separate institutions focusing on 
such issues as trade, climate, finance and migration. This makes it very difficult to take a systems 
perspective on global challenges or to identify spillovers and contradictions in the actions of states and 
international agencies. Complete and thorough assessments of the multiple and at times overlapping 
architectural issues of global governance are needed to ensure that global cooperation is efficient and 
targeted towards the most critical areas. (UNDP 2014, 13−14.) 
 
If this is contributing to neoliberal governmentality, then it is not neoliberalism traditionally 
understood as a political economy where “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the 
state” (Harvey 2007, 2) are the spearheads of policy. It is frequently argued that resilience fits 
neoliberalism very well through the removal of responsibility from states to individuals. 
However, the studied resilience policies call for both more state and more self-reliance (WB 
2013a, 3, 21; UNDP 2014, 2). States are supposed to be “brought back in” since “[m]arkets, 
while important, cannot provide adequate social and environmental protections on their own” 
(UNDP 2014, 14). Resilience ought to be “a first-order change to governance architectures” 
(ibid., 12) and an approach that links “climate and disaster resilience to broader development 
paths”, occurring at different levels from individual to international (WB 2013b, viii, 16). Yet, 
the major concern is sometimes not biosphere or environmental wellbeing but development 
and the economic sector (WEF 2013a, 17; EC 2013a, 11; WB 2013b, 40). What critical 
accounts are right to point out is that in the end, human wellbeing is losing in importance 
(Evans & Reid 2014; Nikula 2012), and international institutions sometimes seem to regard 
“the maintenance of the system the objective of governance, the measure of success being the 
preservation of the system rather than the protection of citizens” (Welsh 2014, 7). 
 
Chandler (2014b) has provided a different, yet equally critical account of resilience and 
neoliberalism. He approaches resilience from the point of view of systems’ ontological 
complexity, not from that of social-ecological systems or recognition of issues (such as 
environmental concerns) that complicate processes of governance. Similarly to some 
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resilience scientists, Chandler’s (ibid.) ‘resilience thinking’ implies a broader perspective to 
systemic life than ‘resilience’. For Chandler (ibid., 48), “[r]esilience-thinking does not just 
allow us to adapt to a more complex, fluid and uncertain world” but enables the understanding 
that this is “a world in which everything we thought under liberal modernity needs to be re-
evaluated”. He further notes that it is “possible to chart a rise in resilience-thinking as a 
governing rationality without mentioning the word ‘resilience’” (ibid., 3). This is evident in 
approaches such as “Earth Systems governance” that obviously builds on similar assumptions 
as resilience-thinking but where resilience and complexity are either non-existent or merely 
an aside (Biermann 2014; Biermann et al. 2010). 
 
Chandler (2014b) admits resilience and neoliberal governance are related but sees that 
resilience exposes the limits of neoliberal modes of governing and represents the failure of 
neoliberalism’s aim to govern, not its climax. He differentiates between neoliberalism and 
resilience thinking along their understanding of complexity as simple complexity and general 
complexity, respectively (ibid., 27). Simple complexity describes the rationality of 
neoliberalism in so far as it attempts to govern complex life in closed systems from outside, 
instrumentally for specific goals (ibid.). In neoliberal understandings, complexity has been a 
problem for governance “because the emerging rationality of self-organising life, both human 
and non-human, can clash […] with the simplistic and reductionist understandings of 
governments and markets, seeking short-term and narrow instrumentalist ends on the basis of 
linear understandings of mechanical causality” (ibid., 31).  
 
On the contrary, in general complexity there is an understanding that “complex life does not 
have to be a problem or barrier to governance interventions” but “a resource that enables the 
extension of governance into new realms of ‘real’ complex life” (ibid., 34). This is a very 
positive view on both resilience and governance. It tries to get away from ‘ubiquitous’ uses of 
resilience in all manner of policies by differentiating between simple and general 
complexities. This is similar to what Walker and Salt (2006, 120−121) have done with 
‘specified’ and ‘general’ resilience, the former meaning to instrumentally manage specific 
(known) threats and the latter implying an overall capacity to manage unknown shocks or 
disturbances. 
 
It is difficult to reflect Chandler’s ideas on the policy analysis. He seems to claim that any 
attempt to use resilience as a policy tool has gone wrong in thinking that it would be “possible 
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to intervene instrumentally to shape the outcome of these [interactive social] processes and to 
realign them to liberal rationalist understandings of progress and development” (Chandler 
2014b, 37). Following this line of argument, policies that encourage resilience-building for 
complexity have understood the ontological realities of the world but prescribe totally wrong 
measures to govern it. Chandler does not condemn these policies but only questions their 
effectiveness. He criticizes the language of simple complexity – concepts that try to render 
predictable that which is emergent and “evades human control”. (Ibid., 32−34.) Some 
agencies have adopted this technical and managerial language that he refers to, which is well 
illustrated by WEF: “Tipping points and cascading effects are features of many complex 
systems, which mean that the world needs better ways to measure the health of critical 
systems and gauge the thresholds within which it is safe to operate” (WEF 2013b, 29). 
Chandler’s arguments point at features of resilience policies which clearly mark them as part 
of neoliberal governance, and yet he makes “an analytical distinction between neoliberal and 
resilience ontologies” (Chandler 2014b, 27), indicating an ontological difference instead of 
compatibility. 
 
However, Chandler seems to agree with other critical analysts on a point: resilience is a 
framework used to render life and people governable (Chandler 2014b, 34−35; Joseph 2013, 
41; Reid 2013a, 362). While all acknowledge the complexity thinking behind resilience, 
Chandler does not focus so much on the political implications different resilience theories and 
policies have on peoples on which they are implemented, or what is politically and 
philosophically at stake in resilience. While criticizing neoliberal governance, he sees 
resilience as a positive governance perspective, a new episteme to understand the subject and 
the world. From a governance perspective, if the aim of the policies of EC, FEMA, UNDP, 
USAID, WB, and WEF has been to strengthen governance structures and procedures, the 
discourse pursued is certainly doing its job. But if the idea was to include resilience to be 
better able to tackle problems shared by these organisations, it is hardly the case. This section 
first showed how the aim to govern complexity by building resilience has led these 
organisations to claim more and stronger international or global governance and then 
discussed different normative evaluations. Now we can ask what the implications of 
‘resilience governance’ on subjectivity are, in other words, how the relation between resilient 
subject and governing is understood. 
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5.3 The subject’s security and political agency 
 
Governance of life in a biopolitical sense invokes subjectivities according to the prevailing 
governing rationality. As observed in the previous section, resilience policies are to a great 
extent compatible with neoliberal forms of governance. In addition to the governance effects 
of resilience “it is also necessary to attend to the forms of subjectivity it attempts to bring into 
being” (Reid 2013a, 355). For governance to work at the level of the individual – as self-
governance – it requires a subject. Biopolitics puts the life of the subject at the centre of 
politics, affecting the way the subject conducts its life (Foucault 2007, 42−43). As the policy 
discourse is not uniform or unambiguous but consists of several overlapping dimensions, 
there is not necessarily only one subjectivity. We have already discovered the adaptive and 
the entrepreneurial subject, but we can still ask what the subject of resilience governance is 
like, and more importantly, what are its political implications. 
 
The subject of resilience varies across disciplines. Mind-body disciplines such as psychology 
focus on individuals but social-ecological resilience where the current policy discourse 
mainly draws its origins is greatly systems-oriented (Welsh 2014, 1; Folke 2006; Bourbeau 
2013, 9), understanding resilience as a systemic capacity that arises from its interactions, 
change and adaptability. As discussed in chapter 5.1, the organisations have adopted systems 
thinking, albeit the system or the unit that is the object of policy can be as small as the 
household or as big as the Earth, and anything in between (EC 2013a, 10; EC 2013b, 4; 
UNDP 2011, 5; USAID 2012, 13; WEF 2013a, 11). For analytical purposes it can be useful to 
heuristically differentiate between these operating levels, although “they are each related to 
each other with some areas of interdependence and others that operate in a more discreet 
manner” (Walklate, McGarry & Mythen 2013, 412).  
 
Yet, the subject of resilience cannot be identified or described by merely looking at who are 
the addressees of policies. The resilient subject stems from the discourse and is both 
individualistic and generalizing. When individual resilience is concerned, it recalls both 
mental strength and the biological properties of human life shared by all complex adaptive 
systems (WEF 2013b, 18). The individual is resilient by biological nature and by belonging to 
a system with resilient capacity such as family or community. Part of the biopolitics of 
resilience is to make human life the link between social and ecological systems. Interestingly 
enough, Walker and Salt (2006, 5−11) consider resilience as not only a guideline for 
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managing social-ecological systems but also as a capacity of those systems that helps in 
“being more forgiving of management mistakes” (ibid., 12). This idea is reflected in some of 
the policies that argue for the need to build individual or community resilience along with 
institutional resilience so that people know how to take recourse for defending their rights and 
how to self-organise if institutions would fail (UNDP 2014, 11; WEF 2013a, 39). 
 
Although the above examples can be considered exceptions taking place when resilience 
management fails, what is effectively happening is the production of subjects whose primary 
role is to take upon themselves the responsibility of their wellbeing in an uncertain world 
(Evans & Reid 2014, 47). Sketching the future of national resilience, FEMA (2012, 3) holds 
that “individuals, families, neighborhoods, communities, and the private sector will likely 
play an increasingly active role in meeting emergency management needs”. Individual 
subjects are assumed a role in resilience policies that come from high levels of governance. 
But resilience cannot be taken to only concern individuals, because individuals make up the 
populations and societies on which resilience policies prescribe their measures. The main 
point is not about singularities but individuals as a collective. The subject is tasked to become 
resilient, but the reward of this hardly concerns the individual but is claimed by the policy-
makers in the form of a better governable population. 
 
As the world gets more complex and its emergent phenomena more difficult to govern – thus 
adding up to the landscape of possible threats – the subject should accept its status as, in 
Butler’s terms, being vulnerable and always “at risk from the outset” (Butler 2009, 30). Even 
if you succeed in making your house resilient to floods, insure your family for illness and set 
up a firm to employ yourself, “risks are lurking everywhere” because each society will 
produce them according to its cultural valuations (Beck 2009, 13). Hence, you have entered a 
‘full-life crisis’ (Evans & Reid 2014, 100). Is this understanding of the resilient subject as 
always vulnerable but prepared for risk just commensurate with reality? It has been argued 
that accepting the subject’s mission to build resilience to survive in the catastrophic 
topography of the present is actually sacrificing the basic human desire to achieve security, 
security understood as being free from danger (Evans & Reid 2013, 83, 87). 
 
If security is understood as a continuous absence of danger, or as closing the subjects off from 
their dangerous ‘milieu’ (Zebrowski 2013, 12), it is obvious that resilience discourse excludes 
it. For “[n]o matter how well a country is prepared and how good its policy framework is, 
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shocks occur, often with inevitable and highly destructive consequences. The key objective is 
then to rebuild while increasing social, material and institutional resilience”. (UNDP 2014, 
11.) And if danger is understood as threats to wellbeing and safety then surely no actor can 
declare security by saying that causes of endangerment are gone. It would seem foolish to 
believe that for example hurricanes will no longer trouble anyone and economic downturns 
will not affect our job markets. Resilience policies are thus likely to address crises and 
vulnerabilities that are said to increase in some countries or social groups (EC 2013b, 2; 
UNDP 2011, 8; WB 2013a, 15). All this implies that in the resilience discourse, uncertainty is 
not the same as danger or insecurity, and systems are secured “through their contingency” 
(Zebrowski 2009, emphasis in the original), not by excluding danger. 
 
Do resilience and security, then, necessarily exclude each other? The analysis found claims 
“for a more secure world” (UNDP 2014, 1, 13; WB 3013a, 3) but they are few. Resilience is 
contributing more to special areas like food or border security (EC 2013b, 5; WEF 2013b, 
29). Chandler (2012, 216) has articulated resilience as the current paradigm shift in human 
security – now understood as “prevention rather than intervention, empowerment rather than 
protection, and work upon the vulnerable rather than upon victims” – and thus a mere decline 
in the use of the term in policy documents does not indicate abandonment of security. While 
there are many understandings of human security, they all “shift the referent object of security 
from states to individuals, or to people collectively” (Alt 2013, 89). In this human security 
framework, the resilient subject is an “active” and “empowered” agent that can “positively or 
successfully adapt to external problems or threats” (Chandler 2012, 217).10 USAID (2012, 3) 
notes that “[w]hile we cannot stop shocks from happening, we must increase our focus on 
helping people and their societies withstand and recover from them”. Resilience policies call 
for responsibility in all levels, and the role of states is to manage risks – even from the market 
– and to give direct support to individuals at risk (UNDP 2014, 8, 14; WB 2013a, 21). Even 
though the policy analysis did not consider security agencies specifically, it reflects the 
general shift in the subject of (human) security frameworks: resilience policies do not object 
to security per se but acknowledge the shift from an intervening and protecting state to the 
empowered individual; a “shift from a state-based to a society-based understanding of 
security practices” (Chandler 2012, 217). 
  
                                                          
10
 For a critical discussion on the latest developments of human security, see e.g. Alt 2013. 
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While resilience policies call for arrangements that are meant to empower the subject and 
enable it to secure itself materially or physically, what some argue to be even more at stake in 
resilience is the question of security in a political and philosophical sense, not the human 
security Chandler connects with it. Evans and Reid (2013, 87, 90−93) point out that resilience 
discourses create a subject whose ontological status is vulnerability and who thus has to 
accept vulnerability as a truth that conditions it to thrive on its inherent resilient capacities. 
From this they conclude that the subject cannot even dream that things were different or that 
there would be less danger and more security (Evans & Reid 2013, 95; 2014, 79). The 
resilient subject is an adaptive subject, which is seen to fundamentally conflict with political 
agency understood as a capacity for political transformation (Evans & Reid 2014, 119).  
 
Following this line of understanding, “adaptation implies a political passivity that accepts and 
takes for granted the inability to challenge that which demands adaptation” (Alt 2013, 101). 
The critical conclusion is that resilience is not only desecuritizing but depoliticizing, “closing 
down alternate possibilities” and political struggle (Neocleus 2012, 192). Intervention through 
resilience is not the liberal intervention legitimized by ‘the responsibility to protect’, but an 
effective, indirect, and dispersed form that allows the subject “a degree of autonomy” from 
the state (Zebrowski 2009). Thus, there is a space of autonomy for the subject but one that is 
constrained by structures of governance so that the empowerment resilience could bring about 
remains rather spurious. Joseph (2013, 46) claims that the active agency resilience should 
contribute to is actually undermined by resilience programmes that “work on the assumption 
that intervention is necessary because people lack an adequate understanding to cope with 
freedom and autonomy”. 
 
In some policies the governing discourse has features that confirm the relevance of this 
critical discussion. For example, the WEF (2013b, 13) notes that “[l]eadership in this 
unpredictable world is about managing expectations”, implying that although change is 
certain, it is always unpredictable and people should suppress their expectations of being able 
to direct its course. And yet, when unexpected opportunities arise, the subject needs to act 
swiftly because in such situations the risk of inaction is the worst of all (WB 2013a, 5). It is 
correct to say that resilience reduces the political operating space of the subject if its only task 
becomes to manage risks and its only possibility of empowerment is to develop this capacity 
by learning from the risks that realise. Joseph (2013, 47) calls this capacity-building function 
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of resilience policies only a mask of their real aim which is “to use lack of capacity as the 
means by which to discipline states and their governments”.  
 
In the policies, there is indeed talk about “cognitive and behavioural failures” (WB 2013a, 
16), “failure to address a global risk” (WEF 2013a, 36), “adverse coping strategies” (UNDP 
2011, 5) and even “a false sense of security” created by short-term solutions (WB 2013b, 15) 
that might be the ‘natural’ reactions of the subject in adverse events. The quotes show a 
concern for the resilience of states and societies, particularly poor ones. We can see that it is 
not only a shift of responsibility from the state to the individual, but “a shift from Western 
responsibility for securing the other to enabling the other to secure itself” (Chandler 2012, 
225). Here lies a problematic that those states that still have the means to protect their citizens 
will continue to do so while people in more insecure countries are left with a mission to 
secure themselves. This is in keeping with the neoliberal bottom-up governance through 
interventions into social relations. 
 
While Evans and Reid (2014) conclude that the political implications of neoliberal 
governmentality on subjectivity are so problematic that there is a need to move beyond the 
resilient subject and neoliberal subjectivities in general, Chandler (2014b) sees in resilience a 
subject that is no longer constrained by liberal frameworks and whose subjectivity is based on 
post-interventionist or ‘post-liberal’ governance. Chandler is correct to note shifts in 
responsibility that resilience has brought about and the complexity of the world that lies 
behind it, but he ignores the possible negative implications of resilience governance. The 
policy analysis reflects the challenges of the organisations to conduct the work they are set up 
for in national emergency management, development, international economics, or 
environmental protection, which might be the reason why they are reaching out for resilience 
as a governing discourse. Looking at the resilience policies of “international organisations 
that fall under the inﬂuence of Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking“ (Joseph 2013, 45), it is hard to 
comprehend a post-liberal turn having taken place, as the discourse reflects a firm intention to 
strengthen, not weaken, the dominant governance institutions.  
 
We can conclude that the subject’s role in resilience policies is to be a part of the joint 
enterprise of governance where responsibilities of actors in different levels are acknowledged. 
Yet, the role of the resilient subject (both at individual and societal levels) is sometimes 
emphasised to the extent that the responsibility of supporting institutions is indirectly 
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sidestepped. On the one hand, the subject gets empowered by resilience because it gets to 
influence its future and is given tools that can help in building resilient capacity. On the other 
hand, resilience policies are formulated by agencies that can use them intentionally or 
inadvertently in ways that in the last instance produce insecure and depoliticised 
subjectivities. 
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6 Rethinking resilience 
 
Resilience should encourage the subject to believe in a good life despite the threats that it 
might face, and not to passively make it accept forms of suffering that are a consequence of 
the world’s disastrous nature. Has the original idea of resilience as a positive capacity, and 
whatever useful effects it might have for instance in reducing losses from material and mental 
shocks, been undermined by the governance discourse? Has resilience building in a neoliberal 
framework shifted “the emphasis from positive adaptation despite adversity to positive 
adaptation to adversity” (Bottrell 2009, 334, emphasis in the original)? Providing that the 
current resilience policies have problematic political implications for the subject, there is a 
need to rethink or reformulate resilience policies and our understanding of what resilience 
could mean for the subject. Could resilience be an affirmative aspect of subjectivity and 
governance? This chapter engages in rethinking the concept and subjectivity of resilience as 
well as its applications in policy discourse. As we will see, some new approaches and 
subjectivities have already been proposed. 
 
6.1 Beyond neoliberalism – with or without resilience? 
 
Considering how resilience is constraining political subjectivity, there is a need to think about 
ways to regain the political and politics. For as much as EC, FEMA, UNDP, USAID, WB, 
and WEF praise resilience in their respective policy fields, attaching it with great capacity to 
respond to pressing global problems, under a neoliberal framework, resilience is mostly 
discursively constitutive of these problems and depriving those who apply it of real chances to 
politically respond to them. The ensuing question is: in order to provide the organisations 
with a policy that is effective is there a need to get rid of either the neoliberal framework or of 
resilience – or both? There is a tendency to draw a parallel between governmentality and 
neoliberalism. It is claimed that while Foucauldian governmentality does not reduce itself to 
neoliberalism, it is best applicable to that rationality, and furthermore resilience, in policy 
terms, “fits extremely well” to neoliberal governance (Joseph 2013, 41, 44). Should a 
conclusion be drawn, then, that all governance and policy-making organisations are held 
politically captive of this environment, unable to articulate resilience in any other terms? 
From this starting point, bringing politics to resilience can seem rather difficult a task. 
 
 64 
 
Evans and Reid (2014) propose that a reinvestment in the political and the political qualities 
of existence is needed through what they term ‘the poetic subject’. This subject implies “a 
new ethics towards ourselves and the earth” that is not bounded by “the sense of vulnerability 
that is continually promoted by contemporary regimes of power”, and which “also gives over 
to life the political possibility that its aesthetical qualities may have both an affirmative and a 
resistive potential to challenge dogmatic images of thought” (ibid., 136−137, 171). The poetic 
subject is effectively a move beyond the resilient one. It is confident towards the future and 
changes, and alternative trajectories that may come it sees first and foremost as 
“atmospherically-aesthetically-affectively enriching” (ibid., 137). 
  
For the poetic subject it makes no sense to seek plausible and powerful solutions to ‘global 
problems’. Neither does it see the future in terms of potential problems to be solved because 
“we should not colonize a people-to-come by seeking to thwart the open horizon of political 
possibilities” (Evans & Reid 2014, 137). In these terms, policies such as CCA and DRR, or 
economic resilience and resilient development do not coincide with the ethics of the poetic 
subject that would use a whole new vocabulary, ‘a poetic register’ (ibid.), to constitute a 
different discourse on globally important issues. The poetic subject would look at the above-
mentioned policies – cornerstones of the agency of the organisations studied in this thesis – 
and ask “what do we fear that the earth may become?” (ibid.) and why do we fear 
transformations more than anything (ibid., 139)? 
 
This affirmation of “new creations and worlds to come” (Evans & Reid 2014, 137) bears a 
resemblance to the approach of many religious communities towards the unknown and 
ungovernable elements of times yet to come. For religious communities – which, it is 
obvious, are always regimes of truth and practice of their own – the now scientifically 
foreseeable atmospheric and environmental change may be as true as for resilience scientists 
or policy-making organisations, but there is an important qualification to be addressed. 
Theological arguments of apocalypse and an eschatological horizon that have been especially 
important to the development of Christianity have had “a fundamentally positive disposition 
towards disasters […] and conviction as to the power of man to triumph in their face” (ibid., 
160). While the current discourse on social-ecological resilience, as also expressed in the 
analysis, is conditioned upon an idea of the coming catastrophe in much the same way as 
Christian truth-telling is conditioned, a neoliberal framing of resilience lacks an apocalypse 
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and an eschatology because it lacks a vision beyond the disaster “on account of the positive 
change it will bring” (ibid., 161, 163; Dillon 2013, 186). 
 
Hence, one should not mix the “resilience of spirit” (USAID 2012, 24) – of adaptability and 
entrepreneurialism – driving the resilience policies with a positive transformative potential of 
religion. We should, though, consider the relation between these policies and religion. It is 
often thought that the reason for the popularity of religious beliefs in especially poor countries 
is due to a lack of other sources of hope and a need for something that helps in accepting the 
immanent reality, no matter how cruel it is. Now, has resilience become a new ‘scientific 
religion’, targeted towards the poor and vulnerable, and based on immanent realities rather 
than transcendental prophecies? Resilience in a way modifies the well-known ‘serenity 
prayer’: “resilience gives me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to 
change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference”. So there are things that can 
be changed and others that cannot; in other words, there are some rules of conduct which 
must be followed and equally certain domains of life which should not be trodden with aims 
for political transformation. In the same way as religious discourse is always concerned with 
not only transcendental salvation but also people’s earthly conduct, resilience allows a 
modern, regulated freedom to act because “every account of truth is accompanied by some 
corresponding governmental imperative that specifies how one should be governed or 
exercise self-governance” (Dillon 2013, 176−177). Thus resilience might not bring serenity 
but the opposite: constant alertness and vigilance towards the worldly dangers. 
 
With its catastrophic imaginary, resilience in a way corresponds to the religious ideas of the 
prophecy of the ‘salvation’ and the parrhesiastic truth of our blindness towards our present, 
and to a subsequent need to change our way of behaviour so that we could stand a slight 
chance of avoiding the coming catastrophe (Evans & Reid 2014). Although the affirmative 
potential of resilience is obviously undermined, political agency that now seems to be lost 
could make use of some of the transformative, eschatological spirit that religious communities 
often possess: of a way “to think, reason and act with a view to being able to bring an end to 
present times, with the confidence that these times will be succeeded by better times”, of a 
way of thinking that is also “fundamental to politics” (Mezzadra, Reid & Samaddar 2013, 9). 
 
It is clear that the poetic subject is far from the subject of the analysed resilience policies and 
that it does not, nor is it in any way trying to, provide a solution for how to proceed with 
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policy-making so that it would better respect the political agency of the subject. It does, 
however, urge any policy-maker to engage in a critical inquiry with the role that political 
agency has in the respective organisation. Chandler’s (2013a; 2014a; 2014b) response to the 
discussion is again worth noting, for he has set forth for another kind of new global ethic that 
claims to solve the challenges of current neoliberal ideas and structures of governance, 
notably by using resilience, not rejecting it. In this account, what he has named ‘resilience 
ethics’ does not have a clear subject-object divide because it is not a question of the subject’s 
autonomy from the world (Chandler 2014b, 121). Instead, proposed is an interrelated and 
associational subject that is directed by resilience ethics 
 
[…] which works on the basis of indirect assumptions of responsibility, not the basis of legal, 
moral or political responsibility but on the basis of our relational embeddedness: the 
understanding of indirect side-effects caused by our associational connectivity in a complex and 
globalised world (ibid., 122). 
 
Chandler (2013a; 2014b) frames resilience ethics as an approach to the world that will avoid 
the problems we have seen with liberal, linear, rationalist, top-down governmental reasoning 
and makes a step towards emergent, complex, self-organising, interactive, and socially 
embedded subjectivity. Thus, it is with resilience that we actually get (or have already gone) 
beyond neoliberalism. An important aspect of this ethics is its discontent with liberal linear 
structures of responsibility and an affirmation of a “broader and more inclusive 
understandings of ethical responsibility for global problems” that ”operate on a different 
register to the traditional liberal framing of law, sovereignty, rights and intervention as […] 
there is no assumption of preexisting autonomy” (Chandler 2014b, 120, 123). But since it has 
been demonstrated, by various authors and also by this analysis, that the current discursive 
framing of resilience is responsibilising, is resilience ethics not absolutely so? One becomes a 
political agent only in association with others and the environment, and one must assume 
responsibility for all potential consequences of ones actions. This kind of ethics is based on 
the idea that complexity is the key ontological principle of the world and its understanding 
requires resilience. As noted in the previous chapter, resilience policies already subscribe to 
the complexity discourse, which is but one reason to agree with Joseph (2013, 52) that 
Chandler is too hasty to conclude that with resilience, we have witnessed a fundamental 
paradigm shift towards a post-liberal order that is here to stay. This is not to reject or affirm 
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resilience but to note that the reality of resilience policy-making as shown by the analysis is 
hardly post-liberal. 
 
Resilience ethics does make a useful point for analysing international agencies in that it 
reminds how “[w]ith this new type of ‘responsibility’ came an imperative to ethically 
reconsider these institutions in the knowledge that the institutional framework shaped the 
possibilities and actions of others” (Chandler 2014b, 128). This is, along with the imperative 
truths discussed above, another aspect of acknowledging that even if resilience policies are 
pursued for reasons deemed righteous by the policy-makers or by the target populations, they 
do not come without constraints. Even if we do not want to reject resilience altogether, we 
have to consider its deleterious effects (ibid.). When resilience becomes a leading organising 
societal principle, it becomes dangerous. 
 
The policy discourse as it is currently formulated is in many ways problematic, firstly because 
it has been hijacked by neoliberalism and secondly because it has biopoliticised the subject. 
Social-ecological resilience, the leading resilience narrative behind the policies, has an 
impregnable faith in science and expert knowledge which lead to a biopolitical perception of 
the human: human as species among other species and as part of ecosystems they inhabit. 
Both economic and development agencies say investments in access to rigorous science is a 
key to building resilience and sustainability (USAID 2012, 11; WEF 2013b, 29−30). The 
scientific truths, of environmental sciences in particular, have been mobilised by both the 
political Right and Left, thus bringing hard times for the political subject that “must learn to 
accept the realities of the times and disavow any strategy for the transformation or defeat of 
neoliberalism” (Evans & Reid 2014, 150). 
 
Nevertheless, resilience ethics of indirect responsibility follows a logic that “if international 
institutional frameworks have a deleterious effect on ‘quasi-states’, others should be 
considered which could have a positive effect”; also, “threats or dangers are as inherent in this 
relationality as much as positive outcomes might be” (Chandler 2014b, 13, 128). Contrary to 
Chandler’s argument, this logic is still rather paternalistic even if the responsibility laid on the 
‘Western states’ is indirect. Yet, the idea of a change for more positive effects can still be 
used for the purposes of this analysis. Just as neoliberalism has proved to be a very resilient 
doctrine able to “adapt to the hazards of critique” (Evans & Reid 2014, 71), resilience 
obviously yields to the purposes of its user according to what kind of a definition is needed 
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(Walker & Cooper 2011; Martin-Breen & Anderies 2011, 50) and is suitable for different 
political or academic standpoints to “make a normative case for or against resilience” 
(Chandler 2014b, 47). This indicates that because resilience is a fundamentally political 
project and not the result of ontological embeddedness or associability, alternative 
formulations of it are possible to pursue politically. The question is if we can save resilience 
from neoliberalism. For it has been established that there is a need to reformulate resilience to 
the extent that it is freed from its current discursive shackles. The next section will present 
ideas on how, if at all, this could be possible. 
 
6.2 Need and potential for discursive change 
 
Why is it important to see the possibilities for discursive change? Although political 
implications and practical applications should be more important for critical inquiries than the 
discourse per se, and although it is true that “[w]e get nowhere politically by simply 
attempting to condemn concepts” (Reid 2012b, 162), changes in the contents of discourses 
and definitions of concepts do reflect our political practice, and vice versa. Thus it is 
important to consider past and potential changes to our understandings of resilience. For 
example, in the exemplary definition for resilience in UNISDR’s terminology (2007, 
emphasis added), it meant  
 
[t]he ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, 
accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. 
 
Currently for the UNCEB (2013, 13, emphasis added), it is  
 
the ability of a system to reduce, prevent, anticipate, absorb and adapt, or recover from the 
effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the 
preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions. 
  
These definitions clearly come from the same origin in the UN system. Yet, there is a 6-year 
gap between them and one can see how the definition has changed. The object of the policy 
has been simplified from separating human entities from others to talking unequivocally about 
‘systems’. Furthermore, while in the former definition systems could resist hazardous effects, 
in the latter they would be content with reducing, in advance preventing, or adapting to the 
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effects, yet simultaneously thinking of improving the system’s performance. Is this merely a 
cosmetic difference of rhetoric? In the light of the previous chapters, it reflects the all-
encompassing nature of discourse: resilience can solve any problem of any entity. It also 
reflects the idea of adaptive governance that expects subjects to thrive on no longer ‘hazards’ 
but on ‘hazardous events’.  
 
In this ‘politics of the event’, occurrences that display no truth or materiality at their 
emergence are attached with meaning so that “the world is no longer thought, perceived, or 
experienced the same again by the experiencing subject” (Evans 2013, 168−169). The event 
can concern and affect either one or a million people; what matters is their political function 
(ibid.). Instead of a hazard whose nature, magnitude and severity can sometimes be calculated 
to an extent (predicting volcanic eruptions, for example), referring the question ‘resilience to 
what’ to events locates resilience in emergent happenings that those in power tend to use to 
claim truths and to legitimate imperative action (ibid., 188, 190). This is one aspect of the 
discursive development of resilience that has affected the concept’s operational usage. Thus, 
talking about interpretations of resilience is not contradictory to assessing its practical effects 
(cf. Joseph 2013, 44). As Foucault asked how the concept of security “might be 
reconceptualised to perform different functions in constitution of a counter-liberal politics” 
(Reid 2012b, 152), we can ask the same of resilience. 
 
As noted above, the biggest problem now is the victimizing (USAID 2012, 17), 
biopoliticising (EC 2013a, 8), depoliticising (USAID 2012, 19), responsibilising and 
moralizing (WB 2013a, 14, 18) nature of resilience. Sometimes these aspects thwart 
otherwise beneficial uses of resilience. For example, USAID (2012, 10) recalls a project 
conducted among female farmers in Burkina Faso: the aim was to implement a farming 
strategy that would be resilient towards heavy rains, including cultivation of different 
vegetables to avoid the loss of all harvest in case of bad climate conditions. This practical 
application of resilience only seems common sense. The women went on with the proposed 
cultivation method because they felt more resilient with it. But one of the women is quoted 
saying: “I am resilient now. […] Just like the onions.” (Ibid.) Although seemingly a harmless 
joke, it is a straightforward equation of human with onions, and thereby human community 
with an agricultural plant. Here, biopoliticisation occurs in a sentence. 
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It is fair to note that the organisations do not start from the assumption that humans and 
ecosystems exhibit the exactly same capacities or function in the exactly same way. But they 
pursue political programs where capacities similar to those found in natural systems are to be 
‘build’ within social systems. The narrative of ‘resilience made’ is more present in the studied 
policies than the narrative of ‘resilience found’ (Aranda et al. 2012), suggesting that instead of 
acknowledging coping mechanisms that people and communities already possess, the focus is 
on building mechanisms that they allegedly lack from the outset. While it is possible and 
sometimes desirable to ‘make’ resilience, this approach always risks being patronizing as the 
quote from WB (2013a, 23) displays: 
 
For the most vulnerable, targeted safety nets can have a dramatic impact in preventing the 
coping responses that incur long-term costs— such as reducing basic consumption, withdrawing 
children from school, selling productive assets in distress sales, or resorting to crime. 
 
To regain political subjectivity into resilience, policy discourse should reflect people’s real 
hopes and needs. The organisations care about people taking part in formulating the policies 
to solve current challenges (WEF 2013b, 26), and claim that “[a]ll public policies, especially 
the macroeconomic, must be seen as means to an end, not as ends in themselves” (UNDP 
2014, 8) – so at least on paper. For EC (2013b, 3), “actions must be […] jointly planned by 
the people affected or at risk, communities, governments (at the local, sub-national and 
national levels) and civil society”. But it is hard to say whether the cooperation is voluntary or 
passive acceptance of external influence. For example, USAID (2012, 17) declares to 
“promote ownership by strengthening the capacity of host countries to manage and lead, as no 
strategy imposed from the outside can bring about sustainable, positive change.” The 
organisations’ motivation to include local communities and individuals in policy planning is 
coupled with hopes to advance their respective particular goals; often the perception of goals 
and priorities is rather different within the two parties, which jeopardizes the whole idea of 
local ownership. WB shows a clear bias towards local priorities: “Interestingly, not all options 
identified by local stakeholders involve climate resilience. Many involve simple development 
needs, such as electrification and water supply, which can have indirect resilience benefits.” 
(WB 2013b, 27.) It makes no sense advocating for local ownership if the direction of action is 
already determined. 
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During the last couple of decades, attempts to ensure that international policies have a ‘human 
face’ have led to so-called human-centred approaches. We have seen the rise of human rights, 
human security, human development, and lately also ‘human resilience’. At first glance the 
human-centred approach is gripping: 
  
Resilience underpins any approach to securing and sustaining human development. At its core, 
resilience is about ensuring that state, community and global institutions work to empower and 
protect people. Human development involves removing the barriers that hold people back in 
their freedom to act. It is about enabling the disadvantaged and excluded to realize their rights, 
to express their concerns openly, to be heard and to become active agents in shaping their 
destiny. It is about having the freedom to live a life that one values and to manage one’s affairs 
adequately. (UNDP 2014, 7.) 
 
This is a prime example of today’s framings where “human agency is at the heart of 
development discourse” and where “it is the growth of human capabilities and capacities that 
are central” (Chandler 2013b, 67). Resilience is perfectly compatible with human-centred 
approaches to international development because it likewise emphasises enlarging the 
capabilities of individuals, in other words “the choice-making capacity necessary to adapt 
efficiently in today’s globalized world” (ibid., 78). In much the same way as development as 
freedom “is a continuum, the goal of which is never reached” (ibid.), resilience is portrayed as 
a human capability that can be built but is always a project unfinished. 
 
The problem with human-centred approaches is that they problematize the human rather than 
the social relations and institutions in which the human is embedded (Chandler 2013b, 85). 
Autonomy of decision does not exist in the analysed policies because in their neoliberal 
framing, the aim to guide our rational choice-making and ways to deal with current problems 
will only ever provide solutions that are conditioned by the very frame in which they are 
designed (Evans & Reid 2014, 200−203). As Chandler (2013b, 83) notes on choice reduced to 
responsibility: 
 
Genuine sovereign choices are free from external judgement. […] In this framing, it is alleged 
that Western subjects can understand postcolonial subjects on the basis of ‘our’ higher 
developed inner capacities compared to ‘their’ lower developed capacities for ‘choice’. This 
discourse however is universal, as the same framing enables to understand the ‘poor choice-
making’ of our fellow citizens and neighbours, if they happen to be unemployed, to smoke, to be 
teenage mothers, eat fatty food, drop litter, fail to take up higher education opportunities or to 
properly handle their emotions. 
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This passage demonstrates how the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ choices are predetermined by the 
societal framework. Similarly, attempting to increase the power and rights of the subject of 
resilience, a ‘rights-based approach to resilience’ proposed by Marygold Walsh-Dilley, 
Wendy Wolford and James McCarthy (2013) will, while correctly addressing some problems 
of the dominant discourse (such as the responsibilizing local focus), be compromised by the 
fact that it tries to make “a dramatic revision” (ibid., 2) of the concept by criticizing the 
system on terms already internal to it. Posing resilience in rights terms risks thwarting the 
very meaning of human rights which is to be a system of intrinsic values and not an 
instrument to build resilience for ‘adaptive governance’ to work (ibid., 34). It is inevitable to 
ask if resilience as an operational concept is anyhow able to assist people in realising their 
hopes and needs instead of increasing choice-making capacity within a liberal framework. 
 
Before trying to answer, a couple acknowledgements are needed. First, knowing ‘what people 
really want’ is always problematic. People are of course asked in many instances after their 
needs and preferences, but are these voices respected? For the last couple of years, the UN has 
been conducting the ‘MY World’ global survey, asking citizens all around the world which 
six of the 16 named issues they hold the most important. The top five preferences so far are a 
good education, better healthcare, better job opportunities, an honest and responsible 
government, and affordable and nutritious food. Interestingly enough, action taken on climate 
change is the last priority.
11
 It is included in the list in the first place because the survey takes 
place within the process of renewing the UN agenda for sustainable development. The major 
concern for operational action will therefore not be to focus all resources to realise the top 
five priorities, but to ensure that the development process is sustainable. Being an approach or 
a capacity rather than a measurable goal, resilience is not part of the list, but policy-makers 
and indeed anyone who evaluates the policies should focus on how resilience is operationally 
applicable to achieve these ends. 
 
Second, if people want to become resilient, then the role of international actors – such as the 
ones in this analysis – is to provide them with tools for that. This leads to a more profound 
question of governance: do we need international organisations or institutions and their 
policies in the first place – to “fill both knowledge and action gaps” (EC 2013a, 2), to serve as 
a “supportive external environment” that individuals’ own efforts require to be successful 
(WB 2013a, 18−19), or to address “risks that spread across and affect multiple countries or 
                                                          
11 The survey is currently online at vote.myworld2015.org and the real time results can be viewed at data.myworld2015.org. 
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generations” (ibid., 34)? Third, the problem of agenda setting is always present in policy 
analysis, as problematic situations are often contested and there is a disagreement among the 
stakeholders in terms of what constitutes a problem (Powell, Kløcker Larsen & van Bommel 
2014, 136−137.) 
 
This forces to ask if we can genuinely talk about global challenges or problems, or about 
plausible policy responses to them. And yet, how can we in the wealthy parts of the world 
claim to critically come to the conclusion that resilience is detrimental for the poor any more 
than we can tell them to become resilient? How can we say building resilience as part of 
governance structures is something to be wary of and to politically challenge, when in many 
places people have never experienced governance in a functioning form, and where one of the 
top priorities is an honest and responsible government that might then be able to provide for 
good education, healthcare, and job opportunities? 
 
6.3 Differentiating between resilience as a policy tool and social resilience 
 
Neil Scott Powell, Rasmus Kløcker Larsen and Severine van Bommel (2014) correctly 
remind us that there are all the time different resilience narratives at play, something the 
studied policies do not address but only go with the dominant social-ecological variant that is 
only one part of the story. Here it is useful to remember that “[e]ven though increased 
conceptual vagueness can be valuable to foster communication across disciplines and between 
science and practice, both conceptual clarity and practical relevance of the concept of 
resilience are critically in danger” (Brand & Jax 2007). 
 
Locating the practical relevance of resilience has been at the core of this analysis. Besides the 
conclusion that the observable policy discourse is not contributing to solutions but more to the 
continuous presence of problems, it has to be recognised that resilience does not work as a 
solution for some of the so-called global problems that the actors attempt to address. The 
policies try to provide local solutions (i.e. changing local behaviour) without challenging 
problematic underlying structures, including the “logics and implications of global capitalism 
and climate change”, the internal workings of which “generate disturbance and instability and 
shape the uneven ability of communities, cities and regions to cope with crisis” (MacKinnon 
& Derickson 2012, 266).  
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It is therefore impossible that WB, WEF and UNDP that are most vocally in favour of 
building economic resilience would buy into some revised version of the concept that 
effectively tackled the economic problems of people who are the objects of their policies. 
Either the capitalist economic system had to be transformed completely or its conditions 
should be equal everywhere – as in relatively rich communities people can already ‘make 
themselves resilient’ with credit or insurance. How resilience is now posed as a solution for 
unstable economies is a deceit, for “resilient spaces are precisely what capitalism needs – 
spaces that are periodically reinvented to meet the changing demands of capital accumulation 
in an increasingly globalized economy” (MacKinnon & Derickson 2012, 254). 
 
For the same reasons resilience policies do not help in reducing poverty or mitigating climate 
change. The logic of resilience in the EC and USAID documents, for example, is not to 
provide a solution to the problems but to endure them. A complex systems approach that the 
concept has evolved into is deeply dangerous as a societal principle. In terms of the question 
of governance, resilience is a paradox. As observed above, resilience has increasingly been 
translated into inclusive decision-making, public participation and functioning and 
accountable institutions. While all this “represents a welcome advance in many respects […] 
[it is] underpinned by a notion of adaptive management that subordinates communities and 
local groups to the imperative of greater resilience as defined by external experts and policy-
makers” (MacKinnon & Derickson 2012, 261). 
  
Redefining resilience starts by analytically differentiating between resilience as a policy tool 
and resilience as a social capacity. To achieve this we need to get rid of the holistic approach 
of complex social-ecological systems that presumes resilience to work as a solution to all 
kinds of problems in all kinds of entities. For policy purposes resilience can be of help and of 
operational use in some areas, at the same time avoiding at least some of the problems 
detected. From the list of issues addressed by the analysis, natural disasters, environmental 
crises and infrastructural hazards that impact human livelihoods are issues where resilience 
policies can have practical relevance (e.g. WB 2013b, 23; USAID 2012, 17).  
 
DRR, crisis response and emergency management are the related concepts where resilience as 
a framework, as an umbrella concept, can work to deliver positive results. To avoid 
conceptual problems behind the policies, it is necessary to in a way go back to the original 
understandings of resilience as it identified a capacity of an ecosystem to persist despite 
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changes in its environment (Holling 1973, 17). This does not mean to subscribe to an even 
more biopoliticised understanding but to divest resilience of its current conceptual power that 
it does not deserve and that has lead mostly to negative political implications. Recalling the 
separation of general and specified resilience (Walker & Salt 2006, 120−121), we need to 
reduce resilience from a holistic societal principle to the simple but specific question: 
resilience of what to what and for whom? This question helps in differentiating between 
narratives and definitions (Martin-Breen & Anderies 2011, 10). A more situational and 
technical approach can be used to address “problems relating to particular aspects of a system 
that might arise from a particular set of sources or shocks” (Folke et al. 2010), with the 
difference of rejecting the systemic language (Levin et al. 2012, 1−2) and speaking directly 
about the entities that are their objects. 
 
As noted in chapter 3.1, masking any concept as merely technical is deceiving. It would also 
be wrong to suggest that resilience is absent from social relations. To speak of resilience as a 
social capacity of the individual or of the community is by no means unrealistic; community 
resilience is something that can be observed and analysed (e.g. Cretney & Bond 2014; 
Kaufmann 2013; MacKinnon & Derickson 2012). But it cannot be subject to top-down expert 
monitoring conducted by national or international agencies who, while undoubtedly relying 
on community capacity to self-organise (WB 2013b, v), appeal to local communities “to 
organise themselves according to a given crisis-management strategy protocol” (Kaufmann 
2013, 61). Even the social-ecological version of resilience is conservative and not geared to 
explain contested, wicked situations of social life (MacKinnon & Derickson 2012, 254; 
Powell, Kløcker Larsen & van Bommel 2014, 137). 
 
Pursued is not an analytical re-distinction of human and nature. Social resilience exhibited by 
individuals and communities must take into consideration the environment in which subjects 
are always and already embedded, for although human life should not be defined or 
understood by its biological features, it is also never merely social or political (Mills 2013, 83, 
87). Social resilience must be analytically separated from resilience as a conceptual policy 
tool. In Mareile Kaufmann’s (2013, 62) terms, social resilience describes the local capacity to 
govern without guidance through emergent behaviour and creative self-organisation: “beyond 
regulated, controlled kinds of self-organisation, we ﬁnd self-organising practices of resilience, 
which are neither trained nor engineered, but self-generated or created spontaneously in times 
of crisis”. Kaufmann (2013) is correct to note that critique has focused too much on 
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governmental, regulated and standard expressions of resilience and overlooked forms of 
spontaneous self-organisation. The recognition of resilience as local governance is crucial 
because the wicked problems and contested situations that social resilience deals with will 
ultimately shatter “all scientiﬁc and policy-oriented resilience narratives” and be 
“reconstituted through local practice and agency” (Powell, Kløcker Larsen & van Bommel 
2014, 137). In this regard, resistance is needed towards discursive practices that directly 
decline autonomy of local decision-making (WB 2013a, 10; WEF 2013b, 18). 
 
This understanding of social resilience as spontaneous self-governance also rejects the 
politically dangerous coupling of complexity theories with liberal environmentalism and the 
consequent adaptive governance configurations (see Ch. 3.3) that now underpin some policies 
addressing environmental concerns and climate change (EC 2013a; WEF 2013a; USAID 
2012). As previously discussed, in this setting the politically hollow and ambiguous 
complexity discourse only serves to subordinate human needs to environmental ones or to 
‘economic necessity’ (EC 2013a,  2), and to biopoliticise the human subject. There is no need 
to reject complexity as incommensurate with reality, but opting for approaches more suitable 
to understanding social resilience, such as intersubjectivity that recognises the coexistence 
and connectivity of plural non-coherent discourses, practices and performances (Powell, 
Kløcker Larsen & van Bommel 2014, 140−141, 145−146) but, importantly, does not derive 
from this an ethics of global relational embeddedness that entails an ubiquitous sense of 
indirect and emergent responsibility (cf. Chandler 2013a). Conflict of interests has to be 
allowed, and identifying resilience with social cohesion opposed; currently UNDP (2014, 11) 
correlates lack of resilience with lack of social cohesion that is further linked with violence 
and conflict. 
 
Powell, Kløcker Larsen & van Bommel (2014, 137) have suggested that rather than 
advocating for specific reiﬁed scientiﬁc narratives, research on resilience should foster the 
coexistence of multiple narratives and work to empower legitimate local perspectives and 
practices. They further note that 
 
[i]n this regard, there is a need for the resilience research community to engage more actively 
with, learn from and support state-holders in their ongoing efforts to enact, reconstruct and 
hybridise multiple resilience narratives in everyday life. […] At the end of the day, the resilience 
narratives of the research community can only be toolkits to support a greater cognisance of the 
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diversity of the peoples, perspectives and performances that jointly narrate the ‘real’ stories of 
our wicked and contested realities. (Ibid., 150.) 
 
Concerning resilience, the role of EC, FEMA, UNDP, USAID, WB, and WEF as policy-
making agencies is then to help peoples and societies in their free attempts to make their 
livelihoods, living environments, public spaces and infrastructure more resilient if they so 
wish. Resilience should be a goal by political decision, not because of accounts that claim it to 
be an ontological necessity of human societies or because our embeddedness in natural 
systems requires us to pursue it as a capacity of the (biopoliticised) human. The outcome of 
the biopolitical analysis of the policies is that we should not abandon the concept of resilience 
but also be careful of not being lulled into the idea that the currently dominant discourse on 
resilience is either a paradigm shift guiding us into a new world order (Chandler 2014b) or, as 
Evans and Reid (2014) correctly warn, something to facilitate great political transformation.  
 
Regaining political subjectivity into resilience essentially means rejecting the invasive 
language of adaptation and entrepreneurialism, as they practically mean a necessity to 
conform to the needs of and changes in the prevailing political-economic and socio-political 
structure (see Alt 2013, 100−101). There is clearly a need to analytically differentiate between 
different types and uses of resilience. For policy purposes, resilience can be a ‘technical’ 
concept – recognising that practices which look technical from the outset often become 
instruments for shaping conditions for political agency. Here it is suitable to talk about 
systems, as resilience is a capacity of institutions or infrastructure that can be worked upon 
with technical improvements. The human element is there, of course, because humans design 
and work in these institutions. The other type is social resilience, which is a social and 
political capacity of human communities and individuals. Here resilience is about political 
agency; depending on the context, it is a capability either to adapt or to refuse adaptation if it 
is a demand for political correction masked as adaptation (ibid.). 
 
The way the discourse is currently pursued in the policies is problematic for political agency 
in general and for the objects of those policies in particular. The goal for further research into 
conceptualisations of resilience should be to find ways to balance between the interests of 
governance and the autonomy of the subject. Some recent academic accounts have addressed 
how resilience is currently also being used as a concept for resistance and radical change 
(Cretney & Bond 2014; Nelson 2014). As Reid (2012b, 162) notes on reinventing the 
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(neoliberal) subject, it is “a question […] to rethink the relations of the subject to its life 
differently […] so that it might recover a more fundamentally human capacity for autonomy”. 
Aiming for a reformulation of policy discourse is crucial because all the time more and more 
organisations are entering the practice of resilience policies and thus resilience will likely play 
an important role in the near future of international cooperation. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This thesis started from the observation that resilience, a concept that originally meant the 
ability of ecosystems to absorb disturbance and change, has not only been welcomed in a lot 
of other disciplines outside ecology, but lately become amazingly popular as a policy concept 
in various fields, especially among international organisations. As the scope of ‘resilience 
science’ has grown, so have the concerns that the concept is not only ambiguous but also 
politically questionable, even dangerous. Walker and Cooper (2011, 144) write: 
 
[…] resilience has become a byword among agencies charged with coordinating security 
responses to climate change, critical infrastructure protection, natural disasters, pandemics and 
terrorism […] reorienting these once distinct policy arenas toward a horizon of critical future 
events that (we are told) we cannot predict or prevent, but merely adapt to by ‘building 
resilience’. Abstract and malleable enough to encompass the worlds of high finance, defence and 
urban infrastructure within a single analytic, the concept of resilience is becoming a pervasive 
idiom of global governance. 
 
As the quote indicates, resilience has gained currency in many fields of policy; yet, it should 
not be seen as any other concept, but as one that has surprisingly big discursive power. 
Recently many authors have discussed the effects of resilience for global governance and the 
following political implications, yet few have analysed what this means for the policies of 
agencies that have promoted resilience as a tool with which to approach the problems on their 
agendas. The thesis looked at six of those agencies and asked: To what extent 1) does 
resilience in the policies of EC, FEMA, UNDP, USAID, WB, and WEF enable these 
organisations to solve the problems on their agendas and 2) is there (consequently) a need to 
reformulate discourse on resilience? 
 
Using biopolitical theory and a Foucauldian discourse analysis, the thesis discussed different 
aspects of the policy discourse, explicating how truth, power and subjectivity are constructed 
in resilience. The analysis demonstrated that in the policies of EC, FEMA, UNDP, USAID, 
WB, and WEF, resilience is not a practical tool or a solution, but discursively constitutive of 
the problems it attempts to solve. The current policy discourse affects the strategies of the 
agencies so that it confirms pre-existing practices, and affects problem-solving so that it 
further problematizes issues and creates more problems. This is largely due to the prevailing 
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neoliberal biopolitics and governmentality into which the concept is trapped, practically 
ruling out its positive implications. 
 
Chapter 3 looked at adaptive resilience, which is the part of the discourse drawing most 
strongly on resilience’s origins in ecological and environmental sciences. Here, resilience 
primarily concerns adaptation to natural disasters and climate change, which is visible for 
example in the mainstreaming of the resilience approach into DRR and CCA. The analysis 
reflected how the environmental concerns have been governmentalized and the human subject 
biopoliticised as a consequence. Environmental scientists’ emphasis on the interdependence 
of ecosystems and human systems and the consequent use of the concept of ‘social-ecological 
systems’ have been translated into a societal practice whereby human communities are 
expected to exhibit similar capacities as natural systems. Like an ecosystem is deemed 
vulnerable to changes in its environment, in the resilience policies, concurrent disaster and 
endangerment has become the defining feature of the world, vulnerability the inherent 
ontology of the subject, and adaptive capacity the prescribed cure. Thus, rather than reducing 
disaster, the resilience policies amplify it. They do not consider the possibility that there could 
be less disaster and crisis, or that resilience as adaptation could be an affirmative approach. 
 
Chapter 4 critically discussed the emergence of a specifically economic type of resilience. 
Again, it is a capacity, but this time more explicitly attached to economic units such as the 
household or the national economy. Economic turbulence and crises are part of the threat 
landscape that also shapes policy agendas. But as resilience is attached to economics, the links 
and compatibility between resilience and neoliberal governmentality become clear. Following 
Foucault, it is recalled how the population is made governable by introducing practices and 
institutions that make people govern themselves. If disaster resilience is more about passive 
acceptance, economic resilience is an active, though not a self-generated, approach. The 
subject that emerges from the resilience policies is the economic man of the 21
st
 century, the 
entrepreneurial subject. This subject has to actively adapt to the changing needs of the 
political economic environment, which means an economically responsible behaviour. 
Resilience, then, suddenly means for example to have access to credit and insurance, or to 
have entrepreneurialism taught at school. 
 
Chapter 5 looked at resilience as part of the more explicit function of these organisations to 
conduct international cooperation and global governance. In this dimension, the organisations 
 81 
 
use resilience in the wider context of the complexity discourse, complexity – along with 
uncertainty and unpredictability – being the most fundamental feature of the ‘operating 
environment’ of the actors. As complexity necessarily means that the world is more difficult 
to govern, resilience is a very fitting governance concept. The chapter joined the ongoing 
academic debate on whether resilience is the climax of neoliberalism or an emerging 
paradigm change into a post-liberal world order. The analysis demonstrates that the way the 
discourse now works in the policies is definitely pro-neoliberal and consolidating more than 
challenging existing power structures. Hence, resilience does work as a policy tool in the goal 
of strengthening coordination and power of governmental actors. The flipside is the negative 
effect on the subject’s political agency, which is insidiously reduced and constrained as the 
depoliticising language of complexity gains ground and resilience becomes the substitute for 
security. In the current discourse, resilience is confident of adversity, not encouraging the 
subject to be confident despite adversity. 
  
Each of the six agencies and each document had their own emphases within resilience, but 
they all contributed to the three dimensions of discourse: adaptive, entrepreneurial and 
governing resilience. Biopolitics as theory and Foucauldian discourse analysis as method 
worked very well to detect the political problematic of resilience within the policies. 
Biopolitics and governmentality helped to conceptualise how the policy discourse works in 
building regimes of truth, power relations, and subjectivities into resilience. Importantly, 
biopolitics also helped to analyse how political agency and politics are conceived and 
conditioned in resilience, thus providing tools to conceptualise “the conditions of possibility 
for political subjectivity” (Alt 2013, 88). The thesis recognised a need to reformulate 
resilience and thereby the policy discourse so that its biopoliticising, depoliticising and 
responsibilising effects are rejected, as well as the holistic language of complex systems that 
serves to detach the policies from political debate. In this manner, beneficial uses of resilience 
are not nullified from the start. 
 
Chapter 6 explored the need for discursive change and how it could be launched. Despite its 
critical insights, biopolitics as a theory is not very useful in this regard. First, the chapter 
discussed very recent accounts of Evans and Reid (2014) and Chandler (2014b) that aim to 
conceptualise new subjectivities outside of neoliberal biopolitics. Whereas Evans and Reid 
depict the poetic subject that has an affirmative relation to its environment and uses a 
completely different conceptual register to express its political agency than what is now 
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pursued in resilience, Chandler affirms resilience as a new global ethic that can guide both 
governance and the individual into a post-liberal existence. Both accounts give crucial 
insights into the challenges that are present in (any) current usage of resilience, but neither is 
suitable to inform a reformulation of the concept for practical relevance. Thus, some other 
affirmative accounts were discussed and particularly those that call for acknowledgement of 
multiple effective resilience approaches.  
 
It can be concluded that we have to reduce the policy areas in which resilience is used as a 
conceptual tool to those where it can have practical relevance without the problems detected. 
The chapter proposes a differentiation between resilience as a (technical) policy concept and 
social resilience, where the former refers for example to putting in place structures that ease 
predicting natural disasters, so that the agencies instrumentally help communities to achieve a 
situation where they can bring forward their political aims. The latter, social resilience, cannot 
be reduced to policy language or political programming, but describes – following former 
accounts (Adger 2000, 361) – an individual or community ability to withstand disturbance, 
but without losing political agency, thus enabling the use of resilience as resistance. 
 
A decision to promote or resist resilience policies is a political one. Indeed, however 
dominant some discourses of resilience become, they function through us and our 
subjectivities, which means they can be resisted or changed if their truth, power, and 
subjectivity are questioned (Oksala 2013, 71). Also, how can we tell that some countries 
should not strive for national resilience? Resilience can be different than how it is now 
praised in policy literature. So if anything is dangerous in resilience, it is the potential to 
ignore political decisions on whether or not to be resilient or self-reliant (cf. FEMA 2012, 3). 
It remains to be seen if future research or local resistant practices are able to release resilience 
from its current discursive shackles, to detach it from the specifically neoliberal process of 
subjectivation, and to breathe new life into it so that it may serve as a positive, active, and 
self-generated concept. The developments of resilience as a global policy phenomenon are 
hard to predict, but the concept merits continued attention for it seems to prevail in the current 
global discussion on the future international development agenda. Therefore, we should 
remain cautious of the tendency to portray resilience as a societal principle. Although not as 
broadly applicable as often claimed, resilience has, overall, proven to be a very resilient 
concept. 
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Appendix 2: List of the analysis questions 
 
1 Knowledge of life and living beings (regimes of truth behind a biopolitical practice) 
 
1. What knowledge of life and resilience is held socially relevant and what viewpoints 
are devalued or marginalised? 
2. Which experts and disciplines have authority to tell truth about life, health, 
population? 
3. In what vocabulary is resilience described, measured, evaluated and criticized? 
4. What cognitive and intellectual instruments and technological procedures stand ready 
to produce truth about resilience? 
5. What proposals and definitions of problems and objectives regarding resilience are 
given social recognition? 
 
2 Regimes of power and power relations (how power generates knowledge of life and 
mobilises that knowledge) 
 
6. Are there structures of inequality or vulnerability, hierarchies of value and 
asymmetries that are produced by resilience? 
7. What forms of life considered socially valuable, what are “not worth of living”? 
8. What existential hardships or forms of physical or psychic suffering attract political, 
medical, scientific and social attention and are regarded as intolerable, which are 
neglected or ignored? 
9. Who profits and how from the regulation and improvement of resilience (in terms of 
political reputation, financial gain, scientific reputation, social prestige)? 
10. Who bears the costs and suffers poverty, illness, premature death because of these 
resilience-promoting processes? 
11. What forms of commercialisation of human and non-human life can be observed? 
 
3 Forms of subjectivation (the manner in which subjects are brought to work on 
themselves guided by scientific, moral, medical, religious and other authorities and 
on the basis of socially accepted arrangements of bodies and sexes) 
 
12. How is the resilient subject described in each document? 
13. How are people called on, in the name of (individual or collective) life and health 
(one’s own and that of family, race, nation), in view of defined goals (health 
improvement, life extension, higher quality of life, better gene pool, population 
increase/decrease), to act in a certain way (even to die for such goals)? 
14. How are subjects brought to experience their life as worthy or not worthy of living? 
15. How do subjects adopt scientific interpretations of life for their own conduct (self-
regulation) and conceive of themselves as biological organisms? 
16. How can this process be viewed as an active appropriation and not as passive 
acceptance? 
